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Editor’s Note: In this Article by KU Law faculty member John Head, we 
join global issues with Kansas issues.  Professor Head explores a central 
concept of international law—the concept of sovereignty, as exercised 
by nation-states—with an eye to urging legal reforms that will help 
address global challenges that have special relevance to our own state.  
As he notes near the end of the “Introduction” to his Article, the issues 
he addresses bear importantly on agriculture and climate change, which 
are crucial to the future of Kansas.  Moreover, he suggests that 
addressing global legal issues offers an opportunity for Kansas to add a 
new chapter to its “long history of progressive legal reform.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Almost exactly twenty-five years ago, the Kansas Law Review 
published an article I wrote about “supranational law.”1  Now I welcome 
the opportunity to publish—again in this same journal—an update on the 
views I expressed then, as well as a proposal for introducing a new concept 
for addressing global challenges we face today. 
In my 1994 article, I explored international-law developments of the 
preceding half-century.  The year 1944 served as my principal starting-
point because that year saw the emergence of the first generation of 
modern public international organizations (such as the International 
Monetary Fund), as part of a burst of enthusiasm for multilateral solutions 
to global problems.  I offered this synopsis: 
In sum, the legal landscape of the globe has changed radically in the past 
fifty years.  It has witnessed a “multilateralization” of legal regimes, both 
through the rise of international organizations and through an explosion 
in the number and coverage of multilateral sets of rules.  For better or 
worse, we have entered the age of “supranational law.”  New players and 
new rules have made obsolete the concept of an “international law” 
concerned solely or primarily with nation-states abiding by rules 
emanating from their own free will.2 
Did I predict that “supranational law” would in fact soon become a 
more effective system of law than the form of international law that 
preceded it?  No. 
Barring some global catastrophe on the same order of magnitude as the 
two world wars of this century, I expect supranational law to continue 
suffering, at least for the next half-century, from two of the same 
problems that have dogged international law thus far and prevented it 
from maturing into a complete and fully effective legal system. 
One of these problems is political[:] . . . the doctrine of state sovereignty 
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 1.   See John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions Is 
Changing the Character of “International” Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 605 (1994) [hereinafter Head-
1994]. 
 2.   Id. at 635. 
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remains too strong to permit the establishment of an effective system for 
enforcing rules against the most powerful states.3 
Is state sovereignty still “too strong” now, a quarter-century later, to 
permit “supranational law” to emerge and help address global problems?  
Yes, but only barely.  My research and experience over the past twenty-
five years, coupled with the ever-increasing threat posed by environmental 
degradation—especially climate disruption—suggest to me that state 
sovereignty has weakened around the world.  Partly because of this 
weakening, I regard the prospects for “supranational law” not only more 
likely but perhaps inevitable in coming years. 
Accordingly, I am engaged now in a project to suggest how we might 
undertake a reorientation of certain concepts that form the foundation of 
international law and governance.  I give special attention in this Article 
to the doctrine of sovereignty and the so-called nation-state that purports 
to possess and exercise such sovereignty.  In doing so, I emphasize how 
poorly certain concepts rooted in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Europe serve the needs of today’s world, and I outline how they might be 
modernized to make them, and us, better able to address global problems. 
How do any of these topics relate to Kansas—and why am I eager to 
express my views in the Kansas Law Review?  Three reasons spring to 
mind.  First, among the “global problems” I referred to in general terms in 
the preceding paragraph, one is especially pertinent to Kansas: 
agriculture.  In recent years, building on my own personal history of 
having grown up on a farm, I have concentrated most of my academic and 
advocacy efforts to helping escape from the dead-end of modern extractive 
agriculture of the sort that dominates the landscape and economy of our 
own state and the surrounding states of our Great Plains region.  To that 
end, I have published several books and articles4 that (i) explain the 
                                                          
 3.   Id. at 659.  The second problem I identified was that “as a physical matter, our world is all 
we know.  It is not part of some larger population or broader legal context to which we might look for 
a generally recognized set of fundamental rules against which the rules of supranational law can be 
judged valid or invalid.”  Id.  
 4.   See, e.g., JOHN W. HEAD, GLOBAL LEGAL REGIMES TO PROTECT THE WORLD’S 
GRASSLANDS (2012); JOHN W. HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGROECOLOGICAL HUSBANDRY: 
BUILDING LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW AGRICULTURE (2017) [hereinafter HEAD-2017].  See also 
JOHN W. HEAD, A GLOBAL CORPORATE TRUST FOR AGROECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY: NEW 
AGRICULTURE IN A WORLD OF LEGITIMATE ECO-STATES (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter HEAD-
2019].  For an abbreviated treatment of some of these topics, see John W. Head, International Law, 
Agro-Ecological Integrity, and Sovereignty – Proposals for Reform, 63 FED. LAW. 56 (2016), 
http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2016/June/Features/International-
Law-Agro-Ecological-Integrity-and-SovereigntyProposals-for-Reform.aspx?FT=.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/K5P2-WSK2] [hereinafter Head-2016]; John W. Head, Grasslands, Agriculture, and International 
Law: A Survey of Proposed Reforms, 26 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 297 (2017). 
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ecological dangers I see inherent in the form of industrial agriculture that 
the U.S.A. has promoted for the past half-century and that now has spread 
around the world and (ii) explore the role that law can play in facilitating 
a transition to a “natural-systems” form of agriculture.5  Sovereignty—the 
subject of this Article—stands at the center of international law.  Hence, 
making international law an effective means of transforming agriculture, 
in Kansas and elsewhere, will require a modernization of sovereignty. 
Here is a second reason—related closely to the first—why I see a 
strong linkage between the state of Kansas and the topics I address in this 
Article: climate change.  Just as reforming the concept of sovereignty will 
help international law respond to the crisis I see in agriculture, doing so 
will also help respond to the climate crisis.  After all, Kansas faces in the 
next few years the prospect of substantially warmer temperatures, drier 
soils, and groundwater depletion,6 with serious consequences not only for 
agriculture but also for public water supplies and electric power generation 
in the state7—and indeed for the health of our fellow Kansans generally, 
since “Kansas is likely to have four times as many days above 100°F” by 
                                                          
 5.   It is worth noting that from a scientific standpoint, as distinct from a legal standpoint, Kansas 
has for several decades led the world in developing a natural-systems agriculture of the sort that my 
overall research agenda aims to support.  The Land Institute, founded about forty years ago with its 
headquarters in Salina, recently achieved commercially-viable production levels of what they call “the 
first perennial grain crop in the history of agriculture over 10,000 years”—a perennial intermediate 
wheatgrass they have named Kernza®.  See Tim Unruh, Gaining Momentum, SALINA J. (Aug. 4, 
2018), http://www.salina.com/news/20180804/gaining-momentum [https://perma.cc/XAZ9-KF62] 
(last updated Sept. 3, 2018).  Unlike annual grains, Kernza® does not need replanting every year, and 
its deep perennial roots make it highly drought tolerant and pest resistant.  For details on this and other 
areas of progress in developing perennial-polyculture crops, see HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 204–32.   
 6.   See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-F16-108, WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE MEANS FOR 
KANSAS 1 (2016), https://www.kansasforests.org/resources/resources_docs/climate-change-ks%202 
016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DRW-E694] [hereinafter CLIMATE-KANSAS].  As a consequence, crop 
yields are likely to “decline by about 50 percent in fields that can no longer be irrigated” and “[e]ven 
where ample water is available, higher temperatures would reduce yields of corn.”  Id. at 2.  Numerous 
other reports touch on the same themes.  For instance, the 2014 U.S. National Climate Assessment—
touted as a “comprehensive scientific assessment . . . of climate change and its impacts across every 
region of America”—indicated that Kansas and other states in the Great Plains face the prospect of 
“more frequent and more intense droughts, heavy downpours, and heat waves.”  Office of the Press 
Secretary, White House, Fact Sheet: What Climate Change Means for Kansas and the Great Plains, 
OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES 1–2 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites 
/default/files/docs/state-reports/KANSAS_NCA_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL5K-4H28].  These 
consequences of climate change would affect not only agricultural productivity but also the health and 
resilience of other ecosystems (from, inter alia, “increases in wildfire activity and pest outbreaks”).  
Id. at 2. 
 7.   See CLIMATE-KANSAS, supra note 6, at 1.  As explained there, “[a]lthough the state has only 
one hydroelectric dam, conventional power plants also need adequate water for cooling.  
Compounding the problem, rising temperatures are expected to increase the demand for electricity for 
air conditioning.”  Id.  
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the year 2050.8 
I also see a third point of connection between Kansas and the topics I 
address in this Article.  This state has a long history of progressive legal 
reform.  Our state acted early to adopt child labor laws, to create juvenile 
courts, to regulate the working hours of railroad employees, and to pass a 
civil service law.9  Indeed, as one observer recounting our state’s “long 
progressive tradition” has expressed it, “[t]he earliest Kansans fought off 
slaveholders to make their territory a free state.”10  Efforts to improve our 
system of governance—including at the global level, now that ours is an 
interconnected world—should have voice and support in Kansas; doing so 
could contribute another chapter in our state’s history of progressive legal 
reform. 
For these reasons, I appreciate the opportunity to examine in the 
following pages some issues of international law that look different today, 
now that twenty-five years have passed since I last addressed them here.  
First, I focus (in Part I of this Article) on the concept of sovereignty; then 
I discuss (in Part II) the closely related concept of the “nation-state.”  I 
conclude with some observations about (i) how poorly these concepts 
serve the needs of today’s world and (ii) how the concepts might be 
reformed to help us address the challenges, and especially the ecological 
challenges, that modern society faces. 
I. TOWARD A NEW ORIENTATION FOR SOVEREIGNTY 
Countless observers have struggled to define, discuss, disparage, 
defend, denounce, and even deify sovereignty.  Likewise, accounts of the 
“nation-state” abound.  While some of the accounts are complimentary, 
many are critical.  In setting the stage for a summary of my own views on 
the concept of sovereignty—and on its closely-related concept of the 
state—I offer below a broad range of perspectives on sovereignty.  From 
these perspectives will emerge the following six main themes. 
A first theme, explored in Section IA below, relates to the historical 
development of the concept of sovereignty.  It is an old concept, rooted in 
the political peculiarities of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe.  
Although the concept has changed greatly over time, it has retained the 
essential characteristics with which it was born roughly four hundred years 
                                                          
 8.   Id. at 2.  
 9.   See Progressive Movement, KAN. HIST. SOC’Y (Nov. 2001), https://www.kshs.org/ 
kansapedia/progressive-movement/14522 [https://perma.cc/AUY4-W3F3] (last updated June 2011).   
 10.   Conservative Shift Has Some Kansans Yearning For The Past, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 27, 
2013 4:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/04/27/179490501/conservative-shift-has-some-kansans-
yearning-for-the-past [https://perma.cc/GBM3-8J8H].   
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ago. 
A second theme, explained in Section IB below, is that sovereignty is 
a remarkably sloppy concept.  It has changed dramatically over time.  It 
has proven nearly impossible to define cleanly at any single stage of its 
development.  It is liable to cast more darkness than light.  And these 
aspects of “sloppiness” are evident not just if the concept of sovereignty is 
considered across several disciplines (political science, sociology, and 
law, for instance) but even if the concept of sovereignty is considered 
solely from a legal perspective. 
Third, sovereignty is merely a “default setting”: whatever central rules 
the notion(s) of sovereignty might have, those rules are by no means brittle 
and non-derogable; instead, they can be displaced when circumstances 
warrant.  As I will explain below in Section IC, numerous specific modern 
cases illustrate how such a displacement of the standard rules of 
sovereignty has occurred in the modern world.  Accordingly, even if we 
were able to settle on a definition of sovereignty—thereby overcoming the 
problem of its “sloppiness”—we would still not be hide-bound; departures 
from the standard form of sovereignty have been widely accepted where 
specific needs have arisen.  Only in the absence of imagination and 
resourcefulness does traditional sovereignty serve as a very restrictive 
default setting. 
Fourth, we can and should discount and reject popular claims of 
sovereignty that frequently appear in the popular press and political 
rhetoric—what I call “macho sovereignty.”  In order to explain this point, 
I will briefly highlight in Section ID some such “macho sovereignty” 
claims and then explain why they should hold no relevance for the proper 
consideration of how we can use the doctrine of sovereignty in today’s 
world. 
Fifth, perhaps the greatest impediment to developing a more modern, 
useful, and sophisticated concept of sovereignty—one emerging from 
innovations designed to help overcome its sloppiness and to counteract 
“macho sovereignty”—lies in the persistent view that states should and do 
still dominate today’s political world.  In this respect I will examine in 
Section IE a “practitioner’s perspective” on sovereignty and suggest how 
that perspective might be modified by closer attention to recent world 
developments. 
Sixth, even though sovereignty has deep deficiencies, it lives on as a 
term whose meaning we can, with some careful thought, fashion in a way 
that serves us well in today’s world.  It is with this in mind that I introduce 
at the end of Part I the notion of “pluralistic sovereignty.” 
These musings on sovereignty draw from a wide variety of published 
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works.  I should emphasize, though, that I have not tried to be 
comprehensive in this effort, but instead representative.  That is, I have 
summarized below some key points made in a broad range of works 
addressing issues of sovereignty.  Then, having offered those observations, 
I widen my discussion in Part II to encompass other closely related 
concepts—namely, the state, nationalism, patria, and territorial integrity. 
Why?  The overall aim of this Article, as noted at its outset, is to 
explain how poorly these time-worn concepts and definitions—
sovereignty, the state, and so forth—serve the needs of the modern world, 
especially in the face of existential threats to its natural systems.  Against 
this critical backdrop, I intend to propose progressive and achievable 
reforms in international law and institutions, with special attention to 
agricultural reform and effective ecological governance.  I will touch on 
those proposals at the end of this Article and develop them more fully 
elsewhere.11 
IA. Historical Foundations and the Building of “Monolithic 
Sovereignty” 
In my 1994 article, I explained that the historical development of our 
modern concept of sovereignty reflected political peculiarities prevailing 
in Western Europe several centuries ago,12 resulting in what I have more 
recently called “monolithic sovereignty.”13  Let me summarize as follows 
the main points I have emphasized in my earlier accounts:14 
 “Sovereignty is both a historical and a legal concept.  That is, 
an understanding of the concept of sovereignty as it prevails 
in today’s world requires both (i) as a historical matter, an 
appreciation for how a cluster of key factors has influenced 
the development of international relations, especially in the 
Western world, and (ii) as a legal matter, an appreciation for 
the central position that sovereignty is thought to occupy in 
the world’s legal framework.”15 
 Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes had special 
                                                          
 11.   See generally HEAD-2019, supra note 4. 
 12.   See Head-1994, supra note 1, at 612–20.   
 13.   I first introduced this term about two years ago.  See HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 353.  In 
another context, I have used the term “thick sovereignty” in lieu of “monolithic sovereignty.”  See 
Head-2016, supra note 4, at 62.   
 14.   These points draw especially from HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 354–68.  Extensive citations 
to authority appear in those pages for the points that I briefly summarize here. 
 15.   Id. at 354. 
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influence in shaping the concept of sovereignty.16  Writing in 
the sixteenth century, Bodin envisioned sovereignty as a form 
of control that was highly centralized but that nevertheless 
made a king bound by external law, including natural law.  
Grotius, writing in the early seventeenth century, likewise 
gave special legal significance to natural law as drawn from 
Christian teaching, but Grotius went on to acknowledge as 
well the significance of the newly-emerged “nation-states” in 
the system of law.17  What might be called “the Grotian 
Solution”18 was in essence a formula defining international 
law—or what was at the time referred to as “the law of 
nations”—in this way: “the law of nations = jus gentium 
voluntarium + natural law.”19  Hobbes, by contrast, “injected 
much more absolutism into the concept of sovereignty” when 
he addressed the subject in the mid-seventeenth century.  He 
thereby set in position a central legal pillar for the 
international community, “that of state sovereignty.  In doing 
so, he demoted natural law from its place of central 
prominence and promoted the single human sovereign, acting 
under a presumed divine right of kings, to a position of sole 
‘holder’ of sovereignty.”20 
 “All of these developments came against the backdrop of a 
specific set of challenges arising in a peculiar historical and 
political environment”—present in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries—“that involved intense religious 
antagonisms and growing nationalism in the post-feudal 
political system” of what we now identify as Western and 
                                                          
 16.   See id. at 357–62. 
 17.   Id. 
 18.   Various writers have coined the terms “Grotian Tradition,” “Grotian Quest,” “Grotian 
Moment,” and so forth.  See HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 385–86.  One set of authors, citing Richard 
Falk and others, refers to the “Grotian Moment” as “a period of normative uncertainty in which [an 
old structure] of international relations is being superseded, but not yet fully or in any precisely defined 
direction or manner.”  BURNS H. WESTON et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1086–87 
(2d ed. 1990).  More recently, Michael Scharf explored the notion of a “Grotian Moment,” defining it 
as “a transformative development in which new rules and doctrines of customary international law 
emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance.”  Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: 
Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 439, 444 (2010) (citing work by Saul Mendlovitz and Merav Datan).  See also 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: 
RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (2013). 
 19.   HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 361. 
 20.   Id. 
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Central Europe.21 
 Later writers modified the concept of sovereignty to make it 
more absolutist in nature.22  Hence, “traditional international 
law had evolved by the first part of the twentieth century into 
a body of rules that (i) acknowledged and supported the 
primacy of the state endowed with a very robust form of 
sovereignty and (ii) consisted only of those rules that had been 
accepted by states, either by treaty or through practice.”23  
Thus was state sovereignty—construed as guaranteeing the 
complete legal independence of states—confirmed in its role 
as the central pillar of international law.24 
 To a large degree, this view of sovereignty persists today in 
the twenty-first century.25  Granted, there are several 
important ways in which departures from this view have been 
made in the past seventy-five years or so.26  Certain topics 
have been carved out of the authority of states and made 
subject to more “external” control, especially as exercised by 
international organizations that have free-standing legal 
personality but whose powers are nevertheless heavily 
dependent on a cluster of states that created them and 
dominate them still.27  Human rights can be viewed as an 
example of this “carving-out.”28 
 In short, our world in the early portion of this century largely 
embraces what I call a “monolithic sovereignty” concept.29  
This “monolithic sovereignty” is territorial in its conception, 
so that within a single (usually contiguous) physical territory, 
the government of a state is thought to have nearly unimpeded 
authority.  Moreover, the “monolithic sovereignty” concept is 
national in its assertion (or pretension) that state territorial 
boundaries widely reflect “nationalities,” so that persons 
residing within State A are of one nationality and persons 
residing within State B are of another nationality.  Support for 
                                                          
 21.   Id. 
 22.   See id. at 364–67. 
 23.   Id. at 366. 
 24.   Id. 
 25.   Id. 
 26.   Id. at 366–67. 
 27.   Id. at 368–73. 
 28.   See id. 
 29.   Id. at 367–68. 
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these views of sovereignty remains strong despite their 
inconsistency with reality in several important respects.30 
In order to illustrate several of those points, I also offered in my 2017 
book several diagrams31 intended to reflect in a simplified way various 
views of sovereignty, especially those espoused by Grotius, Hobbes, and 
later writers favoring a more absolutist approach—and including also 
some recent developments showing the “carving out” that I noted just 
above (as, for example, in respect of human rights norms).  The diagrams, 
which I show below in updated form in Figures 1 and 2, reflect answers to 
these questions: 
 What are the topics (regarding law, governance, etc.) that are 
the subjects of the sovereignty at issue? 
 What types of entities (that is, persons, groups, etc.) are the 
“holders” of sovereignty in the sense that they have standing, 
authority, stake, voice, or vote to make decisions on those 
topics—or at least have the right to have their interests 
represented and protected by others? 
 What entities are most closely involved in or responsible for 
implementation of such decisions—that is, for ensuring that 
the rules are really followed? 
                                                          
 30.   Id. 
 31.   See HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 362, 370. 
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Figure 1.  Simplified Representations of Sovereignty for Grotius and for 
Hobbes  
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Figure 2.  Simplified Representations of Sovereignty as Evolved from 
the Nineteenth Century to Today 
IB. Sloppy Sovereignty 
The summary I have offered immediately above reflects general 
observations that I made in my earlier writings.  A closer review of the 
broad academic and practical literature on the concept of sovereignty 
yields a more complex and nuanced answer to the question “What is 
sovereignty?”  In the following several pages I provide highlights from 
such a review.  The first highlight is that sovereignty is “sloppy” in the 
sense that its meaning is remarkably vague and varying. 
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IB1. Bartelson: Sovereignty, Fire, and Accidents of History 
In his 1995 work titled A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Jens Bartelson of 
the University of Stockholm provides a critical analysis and conceptual 
history of sovereignty.32  Why?  Because the concept of sovereignty “is 
central to international relations theory and theories of state formation, and 
[it] provides the foundation of the conventional separation of modern 
politics into domestic and international spheres.”33  Bartelson’s book deals 
with that separation as reflected in philosophical and political texts during 
three periods: the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and Modernity.34  One 
of his key assertions is that “sovereignty should be regarded as a concept 
contingent upon, rather than fundamental to, political science and its 
history.”35 
In taking this approach, Bartelson echoes the works of numerous other 
writers, several of whose views are also summarized in the following 
pages of this Article.  Under such headings as “deconstructing 
sovereignty” and “the end of sovereignty,” Bartelson throws considerable 
doubt on just how and why the concept of sovereignty has come to occupy 
such a central role in political philosophy and (more recently) political 
science.36  He opens the book with a comparison of sovereignty and fire: 
In speaking of something as an object, we are generally inclined to think 
that we are objective about it, but because we chose it in the first place, 
there is a possibility that the object of our choice reveals more about us 
than we do about it.  Take fire: since prehistory, fire has been available 
to human experience as a datum.  Still, despite the apparent uniformity 
of the objective phenomenon of fire, it is close to impossible to discern 
a corresponding uniformity in the accounts of fire since antiquity.  From 
ancient teachings on the elements, through medieval alchemy to early-
modern phlogiston theory, fire is an object of knowledge, yet the 
accounts of it vary to the point of incommensurability.  More puzzling, 
when the question of fire is raised today, one is likely to discover that 
fire no longer is a reality for science; there is a theory of combustion, but 
whenever the original question is posed, answers are likely to repeat the 
most ancient and most fanciful explanations.  In modern textbooks in 
physics, it is as if fire did not exist. 
Yet [even] if fire does not exist, we still speak and act as if it did.  The 
same goes for sovereignty.  For all that we know, most human societies 
have confronted problems of power and authority, and where they should 
                                                          
 32.   See generally JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995). 
 33.   Id. at i. 
 34.   Id. at 88–185. 
 35.   Id. at i. 
 36.   Id. at 12, 237. 
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be located . . . .  [In Europe, for instance,] we can discern how the source 
and locus of authority is distributed downwards in a slow chronological 
series, ranging from God to king, and then from king to people.  Yet our 
textbooks in political science have become increasingly silent on the 
topic of sovereignty; . . . [in recent years] the question of sovereignty 
[has been only] seldom raised, and when it occasionally has been, 
answers tend uncritically to repeat premodern or early-modern formulae, 
or to sociologize it away as reminiscent of a bygone age. 
So perhaps we should do to sovereignty what Gaston Bachelard, a 
physicist who turned to literary criticism, did to fire; we should avoid the 
direct question of what sovereignty is, and instead ask how it has been 
spoken of and known throughout a period of time, and connect the 
answer to this question with the question of why it seems so difficult to 
speak of and to know sovereignty today.37 
The approach Bartelson takes to the concept of sovereignty, therefore, 
is historical, genealogical,38 and philosophical.  Importantly, although he 
does not attempt a definition per se, he pointedly disagrees with writers 
who suggest that “the question of sovereignty can be brushed aside as 
irrelevant to modern political science.”39  After all, it is indisputable that 
“modern political reality has the state as one of its constituent parts, 
however intangible and porous it seems,” and “when the political scientist 
stumbles upon the state as a unit of analysis, . . . he will once again become 
entangled in a discourse on sovereignty as its defining property; for what 
makes a state a state?”40 
Ultimately, Bartelson concludes that views of sovereignty are 
extremely malleable, and they change with changing political 
circumstances.  He writes: “I will insist that the relationship between the 
very term sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty and the reality of 
sovereignty is historically open, contingent and unstable.”41 
Having established the parameters and goals of his undertaking, 
Bartelson concentrates on sovereignty’s conceptual history.  In this regard, 
he argues that “most features we hold to be integral to the modern concept 
of sovereignty are absent from political knowledge during [the later 
                                                          
 37.   Id. at 3–4 (emphasis added) (drawing on a 1938 work by Gaston Bachelard on the 
“psychoanalysis” of fire.  See GASTON BACHELARD, LA PSYCHANALYSE DU FEU (Librairie Gallimard, 
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 38.   Bartelson explains that “genealogy is a history of the present in terms of its past” and that 
“a genealogy has not as its task to tell what actually happened in the past, but to describe how the 
present became logically possible.”  Id. at 7, 8. 
 39.   Id. at 1. 
 40.   Id. 
 41.   Id. at 2. 
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Middle Ages and the Renaissance].”42  Likewise, he asserts that although 
the notion of sovereignty emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (what Bartelson refers to as the Classical Age) “contains a 
rudiment of what we mean by sovereignty today, it nevertheless excludes 
certain features of sovereignty . . . . [that] modern . . . accounts of 
sovereignty” regard as “trans-historical[]” in character.43  In short, 
sovereignty has constantly changed over time in definition and in 
operation. 
He goes much further than that, though.  The most interesting parts of 
Bartelson’s book are (i) the passages that explain how the concept of 
sovereignty is by nature virtually impossible to define even at any single 
point in time and (ii) the passages in which Bartelson suggests that with 
the knowledge revolution of our present age, the notion of sovereignty 
might essentially evaporate. 
On that first point, Bartelson emphasizes that “the centrality of the 
concept of sovereignty in modern political discourse has enabled it to soak 
up a multitude of meanings,” with such a “resulting ambiguity” as to make 
the concept highly immune to clear and useful definition.44  In this regard, 
he acknowledges that there is in fact one undisputed component of a 
general understanding of sovereignty: sovereignty is inextricably 
intertwined with the state and with the international system: 
[W]hat makes a state a state?  What is the crucial property behind its 
capacity for unitary action?  What distinguishes it from other forms of 
political organization?  . . .  [S]overeignty is introduced both as the 
defining property of the state and in explaining the presence of an 
international system.45 
As evidence of the fact that this central two-part character of 
sovereignty is widely accepted, Bartelson cites numerous writers who 
claim that international politics came into being when medieval 
Christendom dissolved and the modern sovereign state was born, and that 
sovereignty lies at the basis of all international relations.  He quotes 
Hedley Bull in this regard: 
The starting point of international relations is the existence of states, or 
independent political communities, each of which possesses a 
government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of 
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the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population.  On 
the one hand, states assert, in relation to this territory and population, 
what may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over 
all other authorities within that territory and population.  On the other 
hand, they assert what may be called external sovereignty, by which is 
meant not supremacy but independence of outside authorities.46 
With that quoted passage from Bull, along with others, Bartelson 
emphasizes how the concept of sovereignty generally helps explain the 
essential difference between domestic politics and international politics.  
He quotes another authority for an explanation of why such a difference 
can persist—and why, as a consequence, the sovereignty of states (with its 
emphasis on internal monopoly of power yet external independence from 
other powers) is acceptable: 
The state of nature among men is a monstrous impossibility . . . [and so] 
governments establish the conditions for peace [and are] at the same time 
the precondition of society.  The state of nature that continues to prevail 
among states often [also] produces monstrous behavior but so far has not 
made life itself impossible.47 
Beyond those quite vague and generally-agreed-upon points, 
Bartelson explains, the term sovereignty (and, by extension, the concept 
of the state) are almost hopelessly confused—not just changing over time 
but logically muddled in any single period.  He disparages, for instance, 
the efforts by Jean Bodin (referred to above)48 in formulating a theory of 
sovereignty;49 he cites Niccolo Machiavelli’s “troubled attempt at 
innovation” in explaining the independent existence of the state against 
the backdrop of universalist assumptions derived from the Christian 
myth;50 and he refers to Franciso de Vitoria’s “inability to disentangle the 
state from divine law.”51 
It is with those observations—particularly the ones highlighting what 
Bartelson calls “man’s estrangement from the Christian God” of earlier 
days—that Bartelson starts drawing his analysis to a close.52  Under the 
heading “[t]he end of sovereignty,” he offers these observations about how 
                                                          
 46.   Id. at 23 (quoting HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN 
WORLD POLITICS 8 (1977)). 
 47.   Id. at 25 (emphasis added) (quoting KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN THE STATE, AND WAR: A 
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the genealogy of sovereignty reflects unpredictable and even accidental 
historical developments: 
Interpreted from the vantage point of nostalgia, the above genealogy 
would indicate a fall from the primordial beauty of Christian unity, 
whereas interpreted from the vantage point of a modernized historical 
process, it would look like a progressive series, in which man becomes 
the master of his own political destiny by emancipating himself from 
dogma and superstition. . . . [However, interpreted from a more 
discerning vantage point,] the genealogical series [of views on 
sovereignty] appears as a more or less random succession of discursive 
and epistemic events . . . [that reveal] no meaning, just pure contingency.  
The question how did we get here [to our current view of sovereignty] . . . 
would then be given a most prosaic answer, like the questions of how we 
came to wear the kind of clothes we are wearing, or how we came to eat 
the kind of food we are eating. . . .  Thus interpreted, the simultaneous 
rise of the modern sovereign state and the international system . . . would 
appear quite accidental. . . . 
[In short, the] modern notion of sovereignty does not result from the 
fulfilment of Enlightenment promises of revolution and emancipation, nor 
from the failure to realize these promises.  Nor is the modern concept of 
sovereignty singularly reducible to the organic thought of historicism; 
rather, it emerges as the unintended consequences of the clash between the 
core concepts and forces of modern knowledge, . . . between philosophy 
and history.53 
Bartelson offers then a concluding suggestion.  With the knowledge 
revolution of our present age, he asserts, the notion of sovereignty might 
essentially wither away as unimportant: 
[S]overeignty does not merely mean different things during different 
periods . . . ; rather, the topic of sovereignty – the concept of sovereignty 
as opened to definitional change across time – is so rigorously 
intertwined with the conditions of knowing, that we could inductively 
expect a change in the former [the concept of sovereignty] to go hand in 
hand with a change in the latter [the conditions of human 
knowledge]. . . .  If this is true, . . . we could perhaps expect the imminent 
dissolution of our topic.  [After all, inasmuch as] the foundations of 
modern knowledge today appear as shaky as political reality itself, . . . 
we should not expect sovereignty to remain unaffected in its ability to 
organize modern political reality into the two distinct spheres of the 
domestic and the international.54 
Bartelson’s view of sovereignty—hardly a complimentary one—
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characterizes it as rather ill-founded, confused, largely accidental, and 
possibly on its way toward irrelevance.  Other observers, though, hold 
quite different views. 
IB2.  Stankiewicz and His Defense of Sovereignty 
About a half-century ago, W. J. Stankiewicz of the University of 
British Columbia edited a series of symposium papers on sovereignty.  
Appearing under the overall title of In Defense of Sovereignty, this set of 
essays examines from various perspectives what sovereignty is and 
whether it is still worth discussing.  In his own introductory essay, 
Stankiewicz offers critiques of all the other papers appearing in the book, 
and he sets the tone for those critiques by asserting that “sovereignty is not 
simply a myth, but a fact of political life which is inconveniently at odds 
with democratic assumptions of what ought to be.”55  He continues in this 
vein: 
Despite the claims made by the opponents of the concept, the present-
day exercise of sovereignty is not far from what the classical theory 
postulated: the sovereign tends to be an unlimited, supreme, coercive 
power which has a will and expresses itself through legislation.  What 
has happened is that the loss of support for values in general has once 
again made order the central value, as it was for Bodin and Hobbes [in 
first developing the concept of sovereignty].56 
The emphasis that Stankiewicz places in that passage on order repeats 
throughout his analysis.  He claims, for instance, that “[i]n essence, 
sovereignty is a declaration that if order is to have certain characteristics, 
then an ordering body or sovereign having certain qualities must exist.”57  
In another passage, he acknowledges that “one of the more objectionable 
attributes of the classical concept” of sovereignty is that “sovereignty must 
be unlimited”: this would seem, he says, “to place the sovereign beyond 
the restraints of the society’s normative order.”58  In fact, he counters, “it 
does not do so, since the function of keeping order includes the 
maintenance of norms which are part of the social order.”59 
Stankiewicz defends sovereignty against a number of its detractors.  
Indeed, he offers sometimes biting criticisms of the essays submitted by 
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2019 ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 745 
his fellow symposium participants.  His first target is an essay by Jacques 
Maritain of Princeton—an essay that concludes with this assertion: “[t]he 
two concepts of Sovereignty and Absolutism have been forged together on 
the same anvil.  They must be scrapped together.”60  Granted, Maritain 
offers a large and juicy target for Stankieicz or anyone else wishing to 
defend the concept of sovereignty.  Maritain starts his essay insistently: 
It is my contention that political philosophy must get rid of the word, as 
well as the concept, of Sovereignty: — not because it is an antiquated 
concept . . . and not only because the concept of Sovereignty creates 
insuperable difficulties and theoretical entanglements in the field of 
international law; but because, considered in its genuine meaning . . . this 
concept is intrinsically wrong and bound to mislead us if we keep on 
using it.61 
In building to this contention, Maritain reports that “Jean Bodin is 
rightly considered the father of the modern theory of Sovereignty”62—a 
point that, as mentioned above,63 Bartelson might challenge (by insisting 
that the modern theory of sovereignty is dramatically different from 
Bodin’s views).64  According to Maritain, Bodin’s view of sovereignty 
necessarily requires absolutism—both absolutism in the surrender of 
power by the people in a society and absolutism in the separation and 
superiority of the person (the sovereign) to whom such power has been 
surrendered: 
Bodin’s position is perfectly clear.  Since the people have absolutely 
deprived and divested themselves of their total power in order to transfer 
it to the Sovereign, and invest him with it, then the Sovereign is no longer 
a part of the people and the body politic: he is “divided from the people,” 
he has been made into a whole, a separate and transcendent whole, which 
is his sovereign living Person, and by which the other whole, the 
immanent whole or the body politic, is ruled from above.  When Jean 
Bodin says that the sovereign Prince is the image of God, this phrase 
must be understood in its full force, and means that the Sovereign—
submitted to God, but accountable only to Him—transcends the political 
whole just as God transcends the cosmos.  Either Sovereignty means 
nothing, or it means supreme power separate and transcendent—not at 
the peak but above the peak (“par dessus tous les subjects”)—and ruling 
the entire body politic from above.  That is why this power is absolute 
                                                          
 60.   Jacques Maritain, The Concept of Sovereignty, in IN DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 
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(ab-solute, that is non-bound, separate), and consequently unlimited, in 
its extension as well as in its duration, and not accountable to anything 
on earth.65 
According to Maritain, Hobbes took fundamentally the same position 
that Bodin did about the absolute power of the sovereign.66  That is, the 
version of sovereignty Hobbes espoused in Leviathan, his master-work of 
the mid-seventeenth century, also viewed the sovereign as a “Mortal 
God.”67 
Let us re-read at this point Hobbes’ unforgettable page: “. . . The only 
way to erect . . . a Common Power [among men in order] to defend them 
from the invasion of Forraigners and the injuries of one another . . . is, to 
conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one 
Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, 
unto one Will: which is as much to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly 
of men, to beare their Person . . .  [This is in essence] a real Unitie of 
them all, in one and the same Person . . . as if every man should say to 
every man, ‘I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to 
this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give 
up thy Right to him . . . in like manner.’  This done, the Multitude so 
united in one Person, is called a Common-Wealth, in Latin Civitas.  This 
is the Generation of the great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more 
reverently) of that MORTALL GOD, to which we owe under the Immortall 
God, our peace and defence.  [Moreover,] by this Authoritie, given him 
by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so 
much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is 
inabled to forme the wills of them all. . . .  And he that carryeth this 
Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have SOVERAIGNE POWER; 
and every one besides, his SUBJECT.”68 
Then comes, for Maritain, the great but perhaps inevitable error—
attributable to Rousseau.  Note that for both Bodin and Hobbes, the 
sovereign was always to be separate from the people and subject to the 
ultimate authority of a Christian God;69 this is explicit in Bodin’s assertion 
(quoted above by Maritain) that the sovereign “submitted to God”70 and 
was “accountable only to Him,”71 as well as in Hobbes’ explanation 
(quoted immediately above) that the Leviathan acted “under the Immortall 
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God.”72  Maritain castigates Rousseau for distorting those earlier views in 
introducing as part of his Contrat Social the notion of Votonté Générale 
(“general will”)—what Maritain calls a mythical “superior and indivisible 
Will emanating from the people as one single unit”73—and in claiming that 
sovereignty rested in “the people”74 through the operation of that “General 
Will.”75  Maritain says this is logically impossible.76  He calls it “a 
nonsensical notion”77 that the sort of separateness that both Bodin and 
Hobbes insisted on in their versions of sovereignty could exist in such a 
popular sovereignty as Rousseau posited: “it would be simply nonsensical 
to conceive of the people as governing themselves separately from 
themselves and from above themselves.”78  Moreover, by removing God 
from the hierarchy in which sovereignty operated, “Rousseau . . . injected 
in nascent modern democracies [of his day] a notion of Sovereignty which 
was destructive of democracy, and pointed toward the totalitarian State.”79 
In short, Maritain says, Rousseau failed to discard “the separate and 
transcendent power of the absolute kings”80—who at least operated under 
God and could be challenged in their authority for transgressing against 
God’s higher laws.  Instead, Maritain complains, Rousseau made the 
“spurious power”81 of kings even more absolute: 
The Legislator, that superman described in the Contrat Social, offers us 
a preview of our modern totalitarian dictators [who preside over the 
operation of totalitarian states.  And recall this:]. . . .  Did not Rousseau 
think moreover, that the State has a right of life and death over the 
citizen?  “When the prince has said to him: it is expedient for the state 
that you should die, he must die, since it is only on this condition that he 
has safely lived up to that time.”82 
For Maritain, then, the concept of sovereignty has run its course and 
should be discarded, along with the absolutism that it always had at its 
core.  In this regard, he emphasizes that even as formulated by Bodin, 
sovereignty was pre-programmed to sink into absolutism—and sink it did: 
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Jean Bodin had indeed submitted the Sovereign to the law of God, but 
the inner logic of the concept was to make Sovereignty free from every—
even heavenly—limitation. . . .  In actual fact Sovereignty required that 
no decision made by the Mortal God, or law established by the General 
Will, could possibly be resisted by the individual conscience in the name 
of justice.  Law did not need to be just to have force of law.  Sovereignty 
had a right to be obeyed, whatever it might command.  Sovereignty was 
above moral law.  The story came to its end once the Sovereignty of the 
abstract entity of the State had [with the rise of “nation-states”] been 
substituted for the Sovereignty of the king, and the Sovereignty of the 
State had been confused [by Rousseau and his followers] with the 
Sovereignty of the Nation and the Sovereignty of the People.83 
Stankiewicz disagrees.  He acknowledges that “Maritain is quite 
correct in his contention [that] sovereignty and absolutism are 
synonymous,”84 but then Stankiewicz argues that what Bodin, Hobbes, 
and Rousseau aimed to achieve was the proper “relation between power, 
obligation, and social order.”85  The views of those classical theorists, 
Stankiewicz explains, “can be epitomized in the statement that order 
demands a power structure with a head (or supreme decision-maker) able 
to make ultimate decisions.”86  Again, therefore, Stankiewicz emphasizes 
the role of order.  “What cannot be ignored is the function of sovereignty 
in maintaining social order: it is this function which creates the obedience 
that makes sovereign power and its exercise possible.”87  Although he does 
not say so explicitly, we are left to assume that Stankiewicz would 
acknowledge that the sovereign’s failure to fulfill that function of 
sovereignty would justify disobedience on the part of the subject-citizen. 
Stankiewicz, then, seems to think he can have his cake and eat it too.  
For him, sovereignty is absolute until it stops being absolute due to a 
serious incompatibility between (i) the sovereign’s exercise of power and 
(ii) “the value-order that the sovereignty must hold [and reflect in his 
behavior in order] to fulfill his function as a sovereign.”88  I find it curious 
that Stankiewicz finds this line of reasoning persuasive—that is, that 
Stankiewicz can call sovereignty and absolutism “synonymous”89 and yet 
suggest that the absolutism is somehow conditional.90 
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Another of the essays appearing in the volume titled In Defense of 
Sovereignty reaches similar conclusions to those of Maritain’s essay.  
Stanley Benn of the Australian National University identifies six ways in 
which the word “sovereignty” might be meaningfully used: 
(a) to express the supremacy of a norm in a legal hierarchy, as viewed 
by a lawyer, or by a student concerned with the legal limits of 
discretion [what Benn calls “legal sovereignty”]; 
(b) in a study of constitutions as normative orders, to refer either to 
the omnicompetence, or to the supreme competence within its 
field, of a legislative organ [what Benn calls “legislative 
sovereignty”]; 
(c) to express the self-sufficiency of a legal order from the point of 
view of a lawyer operating within it; 
(d) to refer to a particular kind of legal order, the definition of which 
may vary from one legal order to another (its utility in this sense 
being limited to particular jurisprudence); 
(e) to express the ability of bodies such as armed forces to defeat all 
probable rivals [what Benn calls “sovereignty as ‘supreme 
coercive power’”]; 
(f)  to express the ability of a sectional interest decisively to influence 
policy [what Benn calls “sovereignty as ‘the strongest political 
influence’”]91 
One of Benn’s main objectives in examining these various meanings 
is “to determine whether they possess any common element that would 
justify the use of the one word ‘sovereignty’ to cover them all.”92  He 
concludes that they do not: 
The first four senses are relevant to normative studies and cannot be 
directly utilized in historical or sociological studies without confusion.  
Each of them is a useful concept in its own field, but they seem to have 
little in common.  The first two share the idea of “supremacy” but in 
slightly different senses of that word; the third is an expression of 
totality, rather than supremacy; the fourth implies neither notion.  The 
fifth and sixth senses, unlike the first four, do simply ability to determine 
other people’s conduct; and it is in these senses alone that sovereignty 
implies supreme power.  These two senses . . . can be seriously 
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misleading. 
In the light of this analysis it would appear to be a mistake to treat 
“sovereignty” as denoting a genus of which the [various] species can be 
distinguished by suitable adjectives, and there would seem to be a strong 
case for giving up so Protean a word.93 
The “protean”94 nature of sovereignty as a concept and as a word is 
highlighted also by Kenneth Cole, of the University of Washington, in 
another of the essays appearing in the volume titled In Defense of 
Sovereignty.  Cole opens his essay by observing that “[even the] casual 
student of Western political history encounters sovereignty in a number of 
guises,”95 so that in the age “of absolute monarchy, it [sovereignty] was a 
personal endowment of princes”96 and its character changed when 
democratic regimes arose.97  Various political and historical contexts for 
sovereignty, writes Cole, therefore reveal “the protean possibilities of the 
general conception” of sovereignty.98  In other words, sovereignty has 
proven to be remarkably malleable over time. 
What Cole considers most surprising, though, is that in modern 
times—dominated by “nation-states”99—the notion of sovereignty has 
become so very powerful: 
The initial idolization of the state was to some extent forced . . . by the 
pressure of historical events . . . .  [particularly] the critical events of the 
sixteenth century [that required] . . . shifting to a particularist system of 
maintaining order.  During the Middle Ages, there had been an attempt 
to establish a universal order under the aegis of the Christian faith and 
upon the foundation of a common European tradition reaching back to 
the twin classical models of Greece and Rome.  [Although] [t]his order 
had never worked to insure [adequate levels of peace,] . . . . the schism 
within the religious community [made it] . . . evident that the old order 
was doomed.  The only alternative was to accept the dismembered parts 
as self-sufficient units within which to rehabilitate strong government. 
The principle of sovereignty was the great ideological weapon used by 
the nation-states in accomplishing [this rehabilitation]. . . .  There is a 
sense, therefore, in which sovereignty may be said to have provided a 
shelter necessary for the preservation of Western civilization after the 
religious wars.  On the other hand, however, we must emphasize that the 
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kind of “sovereignty” called for on this account does not by any means 
measure up to the pretensions of the sovereignty which actually came to 
be claimed by the nation-states [over the succeeding centuries].  What 
each sovereign could reasonably claim as a prerequisite for effective 
local government was a finality of decision on all issues arising within 
his realm.  This was because the responsibility for maintaining order 
could not be discharged without insulating the system of law 
enforcement within the state from all outside control.  Hence the device 
of forbidding appeals from national courts to any foreign or international 
tribunals may be justified on this basis. 
But insulation of the nation-state in the matter of law enforcement is a 
very different thing from insulation as respects law itself.  The 
maintenance of order on a particularist basis requires that local 
interpretation of general law be final; it does not require a denial of the 
existence of a general law.100 
According to Cole, the expansive (and, in his view, unwarranted) 
conception of state sovereignty can be traced “to the mistakes of its most 
prominent opponents,”101 including what he describes as “right-wing” 
ultra-conservatives,102 “left-wing” socialists,103 and critics taking pluralist, 
sociological, and juristic approaches.104  Cole says that those mistakes, 
which he refers to also as “the ineptitude of the attack on sovereignty,”105 
have left us with a concept of state sovereignty that “ignore[s] traditional 
conceptions of legality.”106 
Stankiewicz denounces both Benn’s analysis and Cole’s analysis, but 
in ways that I find unconvincing when considering sovereignty as a legal 
concept.  Stankiewicz acknowledges that Benn has identified six distinct 
meanings of sovereignty, “each of which has awkward difficulties of 
interpretation and application,”107 but Stankiewicz’s rejection of Benn’s 
conclusion—that these difficulties should prompt us just to discard 
“sovereignty” as a concept in this context—seems to rest on distinguishing 
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sovereignty is supposedly located.  After proposing and rejecting numerous candidates, he says “the 
most attractive stop-gap candidate for sovereignty . . . is . . . the organ originally employed to draft 
the constitution” (that is, the constitutional convention)—but he explains why, on reflection, it also 
makes no sense to assign such a role to that organ.  Id. at 96–102. 
 105.   Id. at 92. 
 106.   Id. at 90.  
 107.   Stankiewicz, supra note 55, at 11. 
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between a juristic view of law and a political-science view of law.108  For 
Stankiewicz, the latter of these is more important, in part because it is 
“dynamic,” whereas “[t]he juristic view of the law is a static one.”109  In 
like manner, it seems that the critique Stankiewicz directs at Cole’s essay 
also rests on the view that sovereignty should be a concept that serves a 
wide range of purposes, of which the political-science purposes are over-
arching in importance.110  The last line in Stankiewicz’s attempted rebuttal 
of Cole’s essay admits that it is a mystery “why jurists use the concept of 
sovereignty, despite the appalling difficulties it creates.”111 
In my view, this acknowledgement by Stankiewicz that the concept of 
sovereignty creates “appalling difficulties,”112 and that the meaning of the 
concept is more troublesome and less clear in the context of a juristic view 
of law,113 can only support (not diminish) the central position that Benn 
and Cole (and Maritain, for that matter) urge: that at least as a legal 
concept, sovereignty is deeply flawed because its definition is muddled, 
its emergence is an accident of history, and its faithfulness to absolutism 
is objectionable in today’s world.114 
IC. Default-Setting Sovereignty 
In addition to being deeply flawed, it seems that sovereignty is most 
appropriately regarded as also being partly optional, in the sense that states 
can opt out of it in certain circumstances.  This is a point brought home 
clearly by two sets of essays.  The first, under the title of Problematic 
Sovereignty, examines, as of about two decades ago, the political-
                                                          
 108.   Id. at 18. 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. 
 111.   Id. at 21. 
 112.   Id. 
 113.   Id. at 18. 
 114.   Stankiewicz also criticizes an essay by the internationally-renowned Hans Kelsen of 
Berkeley.  Kelsen’s essay asserts that “[t]he term ‘sovereignty,’ while denoting one of the most 
important concepts in the theory of national and international law, has a variety of meanings, a fact 
that causes regrettable confusion.”  Hans Kelsen, Sovereignty and International Law, in IN DEFENSE 
OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 55, at 115.  Kelsen offers means of reducing that confusion but explains 
that doing so requires choosing between two concepts of international law—one that (in simplified 
form) accepts international law or one that rejects international law as a valid normative order.  Id. at 
118–31.  Stankiewicz asserts that Kelsen’s discussion of sovereignty “is not easy to reconcile with that 
of a political scientist”; he surmises that “Kelsen’s difficulties [in dealing with some misapplications 
of the concept of sovereignty] perhaps illustrate why some political scientists have insisted that ‘law’ 
is but part of a larger discipline.”  Stankiewicz, supra note 55, at 23, 27.  Again, I find little persuasive 
value to an argument “in defense of sovereignty” that rests primarily on political-science grounds: 
such an argument does little to address how sovereignty can be used effectively (if at all) as a legal 
concept in today’s world.  Id. 
2019 ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 753 
governance arrangements that apply in a cluster of unusual states and 
regions of the world.115  The second set of essays, published very recently, 
surveys a range of constitutional and structural options that reveal a more 
creative and sophisticated approach to political-governance arrangements 
than the traditional views of state sovereignty would offer116 . . . even if a 
clear definition of sovereignty were available. 
IC1.  Problematic Sovereignty and Practical Solutions 
In his introductory essay to the 2001 book Problematic Sovereignty, 
Stephen Krasner enumerates the questions that the volume addresses: 
[i] [T]o what extent do existing institutional arrangements, rules, and 
principles associated with the concept of sovereignty inhibit the solution 
to some of the most pressing issues in the contemporary international 
order?  [ii] Can these rules be bent?  [iii] Can they be ignored?  [iv] Do 
they present an insurmountable or at least significant barrier to stable 
solutions, or [v] can alternative arrangements be created?117 
In summarizing the analysis of the various essays that comprise the 
volume, Krasner offers these answers: (i) yes, existing rules of sovereignty 
do inhibit the solution of some pressing issues, at least in their vigorous 
application, but (ii) yes, these rules can be bent and even (iii) ignored in 
certain circumstances, especially by means of voluntary arrangements 
reached between concerned parties; as a consequence, (iv) no, the 
traditional rules of sovereignty do not present an insurmountable barrier 
to stable solutions—and just how significant a barrier they might present 
turns on (v) how imaginative and resourceful the involved parties are in 
creating alternative arrangements.118  Or, to use Krasner’s own 
formulation in the preface to the book Problematic Sovereignty, “[t]he 
fundamental conclusion of this study is that the rules of sovereignty are 
not absolutely constraining.  They are not taken for granted.  New rules 
can be written; conventional ones can be ignored.”119 
                                                          
 115.   See generally PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY vii–viii (Stephen D. Krasner, ed., 2001) 
[hereinafter PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY].  The essays in that collection focus mainly on Hong Kong, 
Tibet, Belarus, Taiwan, Bosnia, and Palestine.  Id. 
 116.   REGIONAL AUTONOMY, CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND DIFFERENTIATED TERRITORIAL 
GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF TIBET—CHINESE AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Jens Woelk & 
Roberto Toniatti, eds., 2017) [hereinafter Woelk & Toniatti].  I contributed two chapters to that 
collection, focusing on constitutionalism and rule of law in China.  Id. at 23–66. 
 117.   Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 
115, at 1. 
 118.   See generally discussion infra Sections IC, IE, & IF.   
 119.   PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 115, at viii. 
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Let me briefly “unpack” that set of conclusory statements by 
expanding slightly on some key points Krasner and his contributing 
authors make.  A first such point is definitional in character: as Krasner 
explains, “[t]he concept of sovereignty has been used by sociologists, 
international lawyers, and political scientists, but not always with the same 
meaning.”120  For international lawyers, he says, “individual states are the 
basic building blocks of the international system.  These states are 
sovereign in the sense that they are juridically independent and can enter 
into treaties that will promote their interests as they themselves define 
them.”121 
Second, Krasner then identifies “four aspects, or different ways of 
conceptualizing or talking about sovereignty,”122 as follows: 
[i] Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of a government to 
regulate the movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas across its 
borders.  [ii] Domestic sovereignty refers both to the structure of 
authority within a state and to the state’s effectiveness or control.  [iii] 
International legal sovereignty refers to whether a state is recognized by 
other states, the basic rule being that only juridically independent 
territorial entities are accorded recognition.  [iv] Westphalian 
sovereignty, which actually has almost nothing to do with the Peace of 
Westphalia, refers to the autonomy of domestic authority structures—
that is, the absence of authoritative external influences.123 
Third, Krasner emphasizes that these four aspects of sovereignty “do 
not necessarily go together,”124 and that the essays in the book he has 
edited have been chosen precisely because they show how malleable and 
non-necessary some of these aspects of sovereignty really are in actual 
practice.125  Specifically, he explains that “[i]n Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, 
Bosnia, Palestine, and Belarus the rules associated with one or more of the 
                                                          
 120.   Krasner, supra note 117, at 1. 
 121.   Id. 
 122.   Id. at 2.  Krasner elaborates on all four of these aspects.  Id. at 7–12. 
 123.   Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  In elaborating briefly on the last of these points, Krasner 
comments that “[a] state might claim to be the only legitimate enforcer of rules within its own territory, 
but the rules it enforces might not be of its own making.”  Id.  This echoes a point made by Benn, as 
quoted above: “insulation of the nation-state in the matter of law enforcement is a very different thing 
from insulation as respects law itself.  The maintenance of order on a particular basis requires that 
local interpretation of general law be final; it does not require a denial of the existence of a general 
law.”  See supra note 100 and accompanying text.   
 124.   Id.  In this respect, Krasner explains that gaining international recognition for a state “has 
sometimes involved sacrificing Westphalian sovereignty” and “[m]embership in international 
organizations has required relinquishing control over transborder movements.”  Krasner, supra note 
117, at 2. 
 125.   See generally discussion infra Sections IC, IE, & IF. 
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[four above-mentioned] characteristics associated with sovereignty have 
not been, or could not have been, followed.”126  In short, sovereignty is 
“problematic” (hence the title of the book) in each of those settings. 
Fourth, Krasner then summarizes how, in nearly all of those settings 
(Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc.), some “institutional arrangements that are 
inconsistent with conventional rules of sovereignty have been 
embraced.”127  Post-1997 Hong Kong, for instance, lacks “domestic 
sovereignty” as defined earlier,128 since it does not have formal juridical 
independence, and yet “it enjoys international legal sovereignty” to some 
degree.129  Similarly, “Belarus hardly seems to have made a serious effort 
to establish its domestic and Westphalian sovereignty, and its leader [then 
it was Alyaksandr Lukashenka] has toyed with the idea of relinquishing 
his state’s international legal sovereignty as well,” especially by 
“press[ing] the Russian government to conclude one agreement after 
another to accelerate the integration, or reintegration, of the two countries’ 
economies and to forge the closest possible political ties.”130  Likewise, 
the situation in Taiwan “also confounds convention notions of 
sovereignty,” inasmuch as “Taiwan has prospered in a kind of never-never 
land where it has many of the attributes of fully sovereign states—
territory, population, and domestic and Westphalian sovereignty—but 
only very limited international legal sovereignty.”131 
Fifth, Krasner highlights the fact that Tibet appears to be a case in 
which “the rules associated with sovereignty appear to have powerfully 
constrained the options that are available to actors,” as is evident in the 
fact that neither Tibet’s leaders “nor the leaders of China appear willing to 
embrace a status that would be something in between complete 
independence on the one hand and the status quo on the other.”132  This 
special case of Tibet is one that I will return to in Section IC2, immediately 
following this one. 
Lastly, in offering some concluding remarks, Krasner portrays the 
traditional approach to state sovereignty as relying on a “bundled” 
concept, under which all four of the aspects of sovereignty—
                                                          
 126.   Krasner, supra note 117, at 2. 
 127.   Id. at 4. 
 128.   See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 129.   Krasner, supra note 117, at 4. 
 130.   Id. at 16.  Krasner continues by explaining that Lukashenka “seems intent on ignoring, even 
to the extent of violating[,] some of the basic rules of international legal sovereignty by displacing 
foreign ambassadors from their residences.”  Id. at 16. 
 131.   Id. at 17.  For a discussion of these four attributes of sovereign states, see infra note 386 and 
accompanying text.  
 132.   Krasner, supra note 117, at 3. 
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interdependence sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, international legal 
sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty, to use his terms—are assumed 
to be necessary elements to consider a state “really” sovereign.  According 
to Krasner, this “bundled” approach is wrong: “By so readily accepting 
the bundled nature of sovereignty, students of international politics have 
constrained the range of issues they have addressed.”133  They should 
instead try to understand “the conditions under which alternatives to 
conventional notions of sovereignty are viable.”134  Doing so for the cases 
summarized in the book he has edited shows that as a practical matter, 
“sovereignty in its fully bundled form [sometimes] does not provide an 
optimal outcome.  In some instances, including Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
decision makers have found a plausible alternative.  In others, such as 
Tibet, they have not.”135  In those instances, the “bundled” approach to 
sovereignty is “the default.”136  Krasner cautions, however, that whatever 
innovative institutional arrangements are constructed are most likely to 
work “if they are the result of voluntary agreements that establish 
equilibrium outcomes.”137 
The work of Krasner and his contributing authors strongly suggests 
that two ingredients are most important in dealing with the concept of 
sovereignty in the setting that, as I explained at the outset of this Article, 
stand at the centerpiece of my current research—that is, global institutional 
measures to facilitate a transition to a new natural-systems form of 
agriculture.  Those two ingredients are imagination and negotiation.  
Imagination is needed to design ways in which a range of affected 
entities—existing states, nongovernment organizations, international 
institutions, farmers, and others—can participate in the formulation and 
implementation of ecologically responsible rules governing agricultural 
production and ecological protection.  Negotiation will be needed in order 
to move from design to agreement, bearing in mind Krasner’s cautionary 
note that alternatives to what he calls the traditional “bundled” approach 
to sovereignty are most likely to work if they result from voluntary 
cooperation. 
IC2.  Options for Tibet and Other Specific Instances 
Before studying these two ingredients—imagination and 
                                                          
 133.   Id. at 20. 
 134.   Id.  
 135.   Id.  
 136.   Id. 
 137.   Id. at 21. 
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negotiation—more closely, let us see how another quite recent set of 
observations on sovereignty might provide further guidance.  Recall that 
Krasner identified Tibet as a case in which traditional sovereignty rules 
served as powerful constraints on the options available to Tibet and the 
People’s Republic of China in constructing a status between those two 
entities that is satisfactory to them both.138  A 2017 volume of essays 
attempts to whittle away at those constraints by surveying a variety of 
administrative and governance arrangements that have been put in place 
around the world to address special needs and circumstances of distinct 
populations within states. 
As explained by Jens Woelk, one of the editors of the 2017 Tibet-
related book, the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan 
People (2008), is a proposal issued by the Tibetan Government in Exile in 
hopes of identifying a mechanism by which “the specific needs of the 
Tibet nationality for autonomy and self-government can be met through 
application of the principles on autonomy of the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China.”139  Woelk continues: 
The Memorandum is a Tibetan projection of the instrument of autonomy 
into the Chinese constitutional and legal framework . . . .  The 
Memorandum uses the frame of the Chinese system and in particular two 
of its pillars: the differentiated and asymmetrical system of territorial 
governance and the elaborated system of minority-protection.140 
Those two “pillars” of the Chinese system can, Woelk argues, provide 
adequate constitutional grounds for providing autonomy to Tibet—not 
independence, not secession, not “external sovereignty,” but autonomy.141  
He then explains that although a “right to autonomy is not (yet) recognised 
in international law,”142 there are in fact “numerous autonomy 
arrangements around the world.”143  He also explains that “[t]erritorial 
autonomy enables a group [of people] to form a de facto majority within 
                                                          
 138.   See discussion infra Section IC1. 
 139.   Jens Woelk, Neither Panacea, nor Pandora’s Box: Comparing Autonomy with a View on 
Tibet and China, in Woelk & Toniatti, supra note 116, at 12 (citing the “Memorandum” itself). 
 140.   Id. at 14. 
 141.   Id. 
 142.   Id. at 2.  For discussions of the movement toward a right to autonomy in international law, 
Woelk cites BEYOND A ONE-DIMENSIONAL STATE: AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY? (Zelim 
Skurbaty ed., 2005) and Steven C. Roach, Minority Rights and an Emergent International Right to 
Autonomy: A Historical and Normative Assessment, 11 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 411 
(2004).  Woelk also acknowledges that “[t]he term autonomy is used differently by [various] scholars” 
and directs readers to Michael Tkacik, The Characteristics of Forms of Autonomy, 15 INT’L J. ON 
MINORITY & GROUP RTS 369 (2008). 
 143.   Woelk, supra note 139, at 3. 
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(a part of) the State, [and] thereby exercise[] . . . [a significant] degree of 
control on government in this territory.”144 
Much of that book proceeds to “draw on the experiences of other 
autonomous areas around the world”145 in order to explore whether, and 
how, some such experiences might provide inspiration for a political and 
constitutional arrangement between Tibet and China.  My interest here, of 
course, is not with Tibet, nor is it with the concept of autonomy per se.  
After all, those matters concentrate mainly on minority rights of human 
populations.  Still, the various illustrations examined in that Tibet-related 
book demonstrate that sovereignty is more complicated, and can be made 
more nuanced and circumstance-specific, than is commonly assumed. 
The particular instances of autonomy the various contributors to that 
Tibet-related book explain come from Italy (Südtyrol),146 Canada,147 
Indonesia,148 India,149 Malaysia,150 and elsewhere.151  In each of those 
cases, special constitutional arrangements have been designed and 
implemented (or, in Indonesia, are in the process of implementation) to 
enable the members of a minority population to live in a manner that is 
consistent with their own character and circumstances, thereby preserving 
their identity and the cultural diversity that they contribute to the larger 
                                                          
 144.   Id.   
 145.   Id. at 2.   
 146.   Jens Woelk, From Compromise to Compact: Working autonomy in South Tyrol, in Woelk 
& Toniatti, supra note 116, at 133 (focusing on the South Tyrolean autonomy arrangement dating back 
several decades). 
 147.   Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, Can Quebec’s Relative Autonomy within Canada be a 
Template for Tibet?, in Woelk & Toniatti, supra note 116, at 194 (focusing on the autonomous powers 
and the relative cultural autonomy that Quebec enjoys within the Canadian federation).   
 148.   Hans-Joachim Heintze, The Autonomy of Aceh, in Woelk & Toniatti, supra note 116, at 225 
(focusing on the special arrangements that are envisioned, but not yet fully implemented, to provide 
autonomous powers of Aceh within Indonesia).   
 149.   Thomas Benedikter, Territorial Autonomy in India, in Woelk & Toniatti, supra note 116, at 
253 (focusing on the special asymmetrical federal arrangements that are enshrined in India’s 
constitution).   
 150.   Andrew Harding, Is Malaysian Federalism a Good Example or a Warning for Solving the 
China/Tibet Issue? A brief inquiry into a half-century experiment in asymmetric federalism, in Woelk 
& Toniatti, supra note 116, at 267 (focusing on the special arrangements for the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak).   
 151.   One of the editors also explains that in several other instances, attempts to put similar 
arrangements in place have failed largely because autonomy rights “are often (wrongly) associated 
with the idea of secession.”  Woelk, supra note 139, at 4.  This is also, he says, “the primary reason 
for the reluctance of States to recognize such a right [of autonomy] at [the] international level.”  Id.  
In that regard, however, he notes that “some recent international documents and instruments show that 
the International Community is at least considering self-government options”—and he cites in this 
respect the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 35 of the Copenhagen 
Declaration on Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the 
so-called “Lund Recommendations” on Effective Political Participation in Public Life of National 
Minorities.  Id.   
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society—and from which the larger society benefits.152 
In sum, the 2017 Tibet-related book provides specific, solid examples 
of how the traditional doctrine of state sovereignty, which the editors 
acknowledge to be “a European invention,”153 has been modified to fit 
particular circumstances calling for more effective governance.  This 
series of actual examples supports the assertion made by Bartelson, 
Maritain, and others (as described above in Section IB) that sovereignty is 
sloppy, malleable, and subject to distortion and departure. 
ID. Macho Sovereignty? 
Much of the foregoing discussion is highly technical, parsing a wide 
variety of detailed definitions and analyses of sovereignty—and, in the 
immediately preceding paragraphs, of “autonomy.”  I suggest now a 
change of pace, in order to reflect on the fact that sovereignty—at least in 
some general form, however sloppy—is a concept that has extremely 
broad and deep resonance in the public at large.  Whatever finely-reasoned 
intellectual treatment we might wish to give to the concept and to how it 
might best be interpreted or modified, we must recognize that this is a legal 
and political concept that gets bandied about widely in the popular press 
and in political rhetoric. 
I start with some illustrations, and then I offer some observations about 
what relevance these “regular-person” perspectives on sovereignty might 
have for purposes of dealing with sovereignty in the context of global 
institutions and transitioning to a new natural-systems form of agriculture. 
 Late in his campaign for the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump 
used the term “sovereign” vaguely, perhaps as a synonym for 
“independent” or “autonomous”: “We’ve seen this firsthand 
in the WikiLeaks documents in which Hillary Clinton meets 
in secret with international banks to plot the destruction of 
U.S. sovereignty in order to enrich these global financial 
powers, her special interest friends and her donors.”154 
 Earlier in his campaign, Trump used the term to signify 
                                                          
 152.   See supra notes 122–27 and accompanying text.  
 153.   Woelk, supra note 139, at 7.  Woelk goes on to emphasize the artificiality of the doctrine of 
the nation-state: “In fact, the (presumed) homogeneity of the populations forming a Nation making up 
a State has, in most cases, rather been a mirage,” especially as “[f]requent border changes and 
exchange of territories made it necessary to integrate groups with different characteristics compared 
to the majority population of the State.”  Id.   
 154.   See Niraj Chokshi, Trump Accuses Clinton of Guiding Global Elite Against U.S. Working 
Class, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/us/politics/trump-
comments-linked-to-antisemitism.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/C87D-8B9S].  
760 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
territorial exclusivity: “Immigration . . . should mean 
improvements to our laws and policies to make life better for 
American citizens . . . .  It is our right as a sovereign nation to 
choose immigrants that we think are the likeliest to thrive and 
flourish here.”155 
 Theresa May, in referring to the UK’s exit from the EU, used 
“sovereign” in the sense of “unaffiliated” with an external 
political structure: “We are going to be a fully independent, 
sovereign country – a country that is no longer part of a 
political union with supranational institutions that can 
override national parliaments and courts.”156 
 In his blog The Patriot Post, self-described patriot Arnold 
Ahlert links “sovereignty” to national character: “This is a 
fight between those who believe in the exceptionalism of our 
nation and the sovereignty that engenders it, and those who 
view America as just another “market” like any other, one to 
be ruled by a cabal of transnational elitists with utter contempt 
for that exceptionalism, our workers and our Constitution.”157 
 The political commentator Glenn Beck distinguished 
sovereignty from “internationalism”: “Global politicians and 
global corporations are playing games; they’ll get rich by 
building a box for American entrepreneurs to live in.  They 
may think they can end American sovereignty and start 
internationalism, but they haven’t met the Americans I have, 
who on tax day will kick out of the box they refuse to be 
placed in.”158 
 Jeff Sessions, before becoming U.S. Attorney General, linked 
sovereignty with border security: “If you don’t secure the 
border, as Trump said, you don’t have a nation.  Your 
sovereignty is undermined.”159 
                                                          
 155.   Trump: It is Our Right as a Sovereign Nation to Choose Immigrants Likely to Thrive, REAL 
CLEAR POLS. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/08/31/trump_it_is_our_ 
right_as_a_sovereign_nation_to_choose_immigrants_likely_to_thrive.html [https://perma.cc/PS86-
F84Z].  
 156.   Theresa May’s Conservative Conference Speech: Key quotes, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37535527 [https://perma.cc/54EB-QPXV].   
 157.   Arnold Ahlert, The TPP Will Destroy America’s National Sovereignty, PATRIOT POST (June 
9, 2015), https://patriotpost.us/opinion/35665 [https://perma.cc/LG5E-KRGF].  
 158.   Glenn Beck, For Sale: American Sovereignty, FOX NEWS (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/04/02/for-sale-american-sovereignty.html [https://perma.cc/9D 
S6-2349].   
 159.   John Hayward, Jeff Sessions: America’s Sovereignty at Stake in 2016 Presidential Election, 
BREITBART NEWS (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/2016-presidential-race/2016/03/24/jeff-
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 In the same vein, a Tennessee congresswoman also linked 
sovereignty to national-border and immigration control: “I 
think that one of the things we have talked about regularly is 
making certain we know who enters and who exits and that 
they’re coming on the appropriate visa . . . .  We need to 
protect the sovereignty of our nation and we need to protect 
the security of our people here in the country.”160 
 Another commentator associates sovereignty with energy 
independence: “What sacrifices American sovereignty is 
when our nation is beholden to unstable nations for our energy 
rather than aligning with allies and developing our own 
natural resources.”161 
 Russian President Vladimir Putin links sovereignty with 
national pride and singularity: “If for many European 
countries, sovereignty and national pride are forgotten 
concepts and a luxury, then for the Russian Federation a true 
sovereignty is an absolutely necessary condition of its 
existence,” Putin is reported as having told a full room of 
cabinet ministers, lawmakers, and community leaders.  “I 
want to stress: either we will be sovereign, or we will dissolve 
in the world.  And, of course, other nations must understand 
this as well.”162 
These various uses of the term “sovereign” and “sovereignty” are 
rather fuzzy in their intended meanings, but their context suggests that they 
aim to convey a sense of national strength, autonomy, and freedom from 
institutions and influences that are “foreign” to the state whose sovereignty 
is being emphasized.  Their content suggests further a sense of 
muscularity, perhaps a “machismo,” to the image that the terms are 
intended to convey. 
                                                          
sessions-americas-sovereignty-at-stake-in-2016-presidential-election/ [https://perma.cc/Y9S5-
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 160.   Matthew Boyle, Marsha Blackburn on Chattanooga: ‘We need to protect the sovereignty of 
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 161.   Whitney Pitcher, Carney: Keystone Pipeline would ‘sacrifice American sovereignty’, 
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 162.   Putin Defends Aggressive Foreign Policy as Necessary for Russia’s Survival: ‘We will be 
sovereign, or dissolve’, NAT’L POST (Dec. 4, 2014), http://news.nationalpost.com/news/putin-
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To some extent, these usages of “sovereign” and “sovereignty” also 
seem to involve the sentiments of nationalism, strength, and solidarity—
and especially a sense of separateness from others (other people, other 
states, other entities).  The significance of these populist and non-specific 
connotations of “sovereign” and “sovereignty” is this: so long as these 
terms are used in vague ways to reflect and celebrate pride in a country’s 
strength, independence, autonomy, and separateness, efforts at 
establishing and nurturing cooperative arrangements aimed at collective 
solutions to global problems (with causes and consequences crossing state 
boundaries) will be hampered by invocation of “sovereignty” as an 
immutable value.  Like the queen in chess, “sovereignty” can move in any 
direction and take out any competing piece or proposal, without much 
opportunity for rebuttal. 
IE. Sovereignty and States from a Practitioner’s Perspective 
In the course of my exploration of sovereignty thus far in this Article, 
I have drawn from a variety of sources, ranging from highly technical 
analyses to broad popular rhetoric and ramblings.  Now I concentrate on 
another source: international practitioners whose views on sovereignty 
bear on “how the rubber hits the road” in actual legal and diplomatic affairs 
at the global level.  For this, I draw mostly from the observations of two 
such practitioners, as supplemented by my own experience in working 
extensively in over a dozen countries and in three international 
organizations. 
In recounting earlier a number of criticisms that have been directed 
against the concept of sovereignty, I offered this summary: at least as a 
legal concept, sovereignty has been found by many commentators to be 
deeply flawed because its definition is muddled, its emergence is an 
accident of history, and its faithfulness to absolutism is objectionable in 
today’s world.163  As part of the book Problematic Sovereignty that I have 
referred to above,164 Thomas Heller and Abraham Sofaer—two highly 
renowned international legal practitioners165—co-authored an essay 
                                                          
 163.   See supra note 110 and accompanying text.   
 164.   See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 165.   Thomas Heller is a climate policy lawyer currently serving as chairman of the board of 
Climate Policy Initiative.  His career has concentrated on law, economic development, and the 
performance of legal institutions, especially those in the developing world.  He was a contributing lead 
author for various reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and has served on the 
faculties of the University of Wisconsin and Stanford University.  Abraham Sofaer served as a U.S. 
Supreme Court clerk, as an assistant U.S. attorney, as a federal district judge in New York, as Legal 
Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, in private practice in Washington, D.C., and as a senior 
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offering a “practitioners’ perspective” on sovereignty.166  In doing so, they 
acknowledged “the confusion, controversy, . . . and scorn that 
surrounds . . . the concept of sovereignty,” and in fact they note that the 
editor of the Problematic Sovereignty volume, Stephen Krasner, has 
“conclude[d] that the concept of sovereignty is ‘mired in hopeless 
confusion.’”167 
Still, Heller and Sofaer offer several reasons why the concept of 
sovereignty is “used so extensively and casually in international 
diplomacy and legal practice.”168  All of those reasons concentrate on the 
importance of states.  Heller and Sofaer insist, for instance, that 
“sovereignty signals a status that has many specific, functional purposes 
in international diplomatic and legal practice, and to that extent it has 
concrete and useful meaning . . . [regarding the central] powers and 
obligations that attend the status of statehood.”169  “States dominate the 
transnational arena,” they explain,170 and the notion of sovereignty serves 
as an exceptionally useful shorthand for summarizing the cluster of rights 
and powers that states possess. 
The enumeration of such rights and powers offered by Heller and 
Sofaer is one of the better ones I have seen.  They explain that “[t]o qualify 
as a state (possessing sovereignty), an entity must have a defined territory 
and population under the control of its own government, which has the 
capacity to engage in relations with other states.”171  They then note that 
with statehood “comes certain rights, capacities, and obligations,” 
including:172 
 The right to its territorial integrity 
 The right to use necessary and proportionate force in 
individual or collective self-defense 
 The right to govern its population by prescribing, applying, 
and enforcing law within its jurisdictional competence 
                                                          
fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.  During his tenure at the State Department, he 
gave special attention to disputes involving Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Chile, and the Iran-Contra scandal.  In 
private practice, he represented the World Wildlife Fund, served as an arbitrator in several 
international disputes, and advised on affairs related to the PanAm 103 terrorist bombing.  Supra note 
115, at xi–xii. 
 166.   Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty: The Practitioners’ Perspective, in 
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 115, at 24–52.  
 167.   Id. at 24. 
 168.   Id. 
 169.   Id. 
 170.   Id. at 25. 
 171.   Id. at 26.  For further discussion of these qualifications of a state and sovereignty, see infra 
note 386 and accompanying text. 
 172.   Heller & Sofaer, supra note 166, at 26. 
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 Eligibility to become a member and fully participate in the 
United Nations and other international bodies, . . . and to join 
in litigation in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a 
party 
 The capacities of a legal person, such as to own, purchase, or 
transfer property, to enter into contracts, and to seek and be 
subject to legal remedies 
 Immunities from the application of national law for its 
noncommercial activities, its diplomats and diplomatic 
property, and its head of state 
 The capacity to join with other states in making international 
and transnational law through international treaties, 
agreements, and conduct 
 The duty to respect the territorial integrity, political 
independence, and rights of other sovereignty nations 
 The duty to abide by international norms of conduct agreed to 
by treaty or considered universal and part of customary law.173 
Importantly, Heller and Sofaer acknowledge that the international 
community, along with the status of states, must be seen as undergoing a 
process of change.  For one thing, “[s]tates are increasingly surrendering 
some of their policy options through international agreements and sharing 
their authority and functions with international institutions and 
nongovernmental forces,”174 a trend that Heller and Sofaer say is captured 
in the notion of “interdependent sovereignty” that Krasner has 
identified.175  However, they insist that legal practitioners understand that 
these acts by states “do not legally constitute a surrender of sovereign 
power, but rather its exercise.”176 
Beyond this general acknowledgement of change, Heller and Sofaer 
also make a bigger concession as they look to the future of sovereignty 
and the role of states: 
                                                          
 173.   Id. at 26–27. 
 174.   Id. at 25. 
 175.   See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 176.   Heller & Sofaer, supra note 166, at 25 (emphasis added).  In a later passage, Heller and 
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The commitments and delegations [that] nations have made over the last 
fifty years do, however, represent a process that has changed the roles of 
states.  It may eventually alter their powers.  States have delegated to 
international organizations and private entities the power to administer 
programs, to adjudicate controversies (especially over trade issues), and 
to propose policies.  Sometimes, these delegations are under standards 
so vague as to confer significant discretion.  Such delegations may be so 
broad that they conflict with national laws or could become so extensive 
that sovereignty would be surrendered. . . .  [In particular, states] that are 
members of the European Union (EU) have materially limited aspects of 
their powers to prescribe and apply rules, particularly in commercial and 
human rights matters but increasingly in matters of national finance and 
foreign affairs. . . .  In the final analysis, the EU states may choose to 
merge their sovereignty into a regional entity, as the states of the 
Confederation chose to do in 1789 [in North America].  That would 
reduce the number of states in the world but would not alter the fact that 
sovereign states control the transnational arena.177 
A point of special interest appears in the last sentence of the passage.  
Heller and Sofaer assert there that action by EU states “to merge their 
sovereignty . . . would not alter the fact that sovereign states control the 
transnational arena.”178 
Really?  In a later paragraph of their paper, Heller and Sofaer 
acknowledge that some of the rights, capacities, and obligations that they 
enumerated earlier179 “are possessed by or may apply to entities other than 
states.”180  The authors have little choice but to acknowledge this, given 
the experience of the EU.  Heller and Sofaer do discuss the EU, noting that 
a process is underway there “that can already be characterized as one in 
which certain aspects of sovereign power are shared or relocated.”181  They 
give several illustrations of this, drawing from various aspects of EU 
governance—decision processes not requiring unanimous assent, 
establishment of common policy decisions on foreign affairs and security 
issues via intergovernmental bodies, and “an increasingly complex mosaic 
of voting rules and judicial capacities . . . [that reach] deep into issues of 
frontier control [and other issues] long imagined to be at the very core of 
sovereign territorial control.”182 
Given these illustrations from the EU experience, it is no surprise that 
Heller and Sofaer acknowledge that “[c]hanges in the distribution of 
                                                          
 177.   Id. at 25–26. 
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 179.   See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  
 180.   Heller & Sofaer, supra note 166, at 27 (emphasis added). 
 181.   Id. at 35. 
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authority have taken place that are profound and that may fairly be claimed 
to reflect trends that will ultimately lead to increased sharing of authority 
with international and private entities.”183  They insist, however, that 
“[t]his process . . . has not deprived states of their predominant authority, 
and [this process] will continue only with the consent of states as their 
preferred course for the management of transnational affairs.”184  Perhaps 
anticipating claims contradicting that position, Heller and Sofaer write that 
“a widespread perception exists that sovereignty, when understood as 
autonomous and effective control over national territories, is on the 
wane,”185 and they acknowledge that “[t]he threat of reduced effective 
sovereignty has led toward multilevel governance as a prevailing practice, 
with an unruly mix of regional and functional organizations of overlapping 
asserted memberships and jurisdictions.”186  Nevertheless, they urge, 
“states remain the decisive transnational agents” and “the dominant power 
in both theory and practice in transnational affairs.”187  Indeed, “[a]bsent 
agreement on what would replace states as the vehicle for transnational 
governance, a sudden, significant decline in the sovereign powers of states 
could dangerously destabilize the very processes that sovereignty is 
currently blamed for obstructing.”188 
In short, this excellent analysis by Heller and Sofaer concentrates on 
states as central to sovereignty.  Notwithstanding dramatic changes that 
have occurred in the international community—and notwithstanding in 
particular the rise of international organizations generally, the special EU 
experience, and the broad criticisms that have been directed at 
sovereignty189—Heller and Sofaer insist that states remain at the center of 
global governance.  But for how long?  In their closing paragraph, they 
hedge their bets on that issue: 
Sovereignty is perceived as a concept in crisis and eventual decline 
because even the more effective nation-states cannot alone satisfy the 
aspirations of modern, domestic constituencies and have therefore 
agreed or been forced to share their juridical powers and governmental 
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functions with other individual and collective actors in an increasing 
variety of transnational fora.  While the future may bring some new 
concept that replaces sovereignty, that day remains distant.190 
What Heller and Sofaer do not attempt to predict is how far distant 
that day is.  What I believe emerges from much of the literature I am 
surveying in this Article—and what my own experience suggests that we 
have seen in recent years—is that the day when a revised version (if not 
an entirely “new concept”) of sovereignty emerges is not very far in the 
future.  If this is true, then it is incumbent on us to consider what means 
and models can be followed in order to bring this about. 
Before turning, however, to that challenge—and specifically to how 
such revisions to the concept of sovereignty could bear on global 
governance relating to agricultural reform and environmental protection—
it remains important to give further attention to several other views on 
sovereignty in its current form.  In particular, I should touch briefly on 
some of the master-works for the subject.  I turn to that now. 
IF. Other Musings on Sovereignty 
Two major authorities on sovereignty, and on international relations 
more generally, are Harry Hinsley and Stephen Krasner (the same Krasner 
whose book Problematic Sovereignty I discussed above in Section IC1 of 
this Article).  Hinsley, who served as a history professor, as Master of St. 
John’s College, and as vice-chancellor at the University of Cambridge, 
published widely on international relations and on British intelligence 
operations during the Second World War.  His treatise on sovereignty, first 
published in 1966, is regarded as an excellent survey of how various 
strands in the evolution of political ideas and of political organization 
yielded the doctrine of sovereignty.  Krasner, who has academic degrees 
from Harvard, Columbia, and Cornell, is an international relations 
professor at Stanford University and is a former Director of Policy 
Planning at the United States Department of State. 
In the following paragraphs I highlight some key points made by 
Hinsley and Krasner in their works on sovereignty.  Then I draw from 
some assessments made a century ago, just as the era of the First World 
War was creating such a transformation in world-view on the part of many 
people. 
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IF1.  Hinsley and Krasner: Politics, Sovereignty, Society, and Organized 
Hypocrisy 
A leading light in political theory, Hinsley offered this overall 
assessment about three decades ago regarding sovereignty, authority, and 
political power: 
Men do not wield or submit to sovereignty.  They wield or submit to 
authority or power.  Authority and power are facts as old and ubiquitous 
as society itself; but they have not everywhere and at all times enjoyed 
the support or suffered the restraints which sovereignty, a theory or 
assumption about political power, seeks to construct for them.  Although 
we talk of it loosely as something concrete which may be lost or 
acquired, eroded or increased, sovereignty is not a fact.  It is a concept 
which men in certain circumstances have applied—a quality they have 
attributed to a claim they have counterposed—to the political power 
which they or other men were exercising.191 
Hinsley then asks what the function has been of the concept of 
sovereignty—that is, what are “the circumstances . . . in which they have 
resorted to this assumption” that “there was a final and absolute authority 
in their society,”192 so that power should be thought of in terms of 
sovereignty.  He says this about when the concept has been prominent: 
The concept has been formulated when conditions have been 
emphasizing the interdependence between the political society and the 
more precise phenomenon of its government.  It has been the source of 
greatest preoccupation and contention when conditions have been 
producing rapid changes in the scope of government or in the nature of 
society or in both.  It has been resisted . . . when conditions, by producing 
a close integration between society and government . . . have inclined 
men to assume that government and community are identical or else to 
insist that they ought to be.  In a word, the origin and history of the 
concept of sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the origin and 
the history of the state.193 
For Hinsley, then, understanding sovereignty requires understanding 
the nature of the state.  On that point, he makes an important distinction: 
although sovereignty is not a fact, the state is: 
[T]he state—or at least the instrument of power to which we should apply 
this term—exists in the phenomenal world.  Properly used, the state is 
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the name we attach to one among the various political institutions which 
societies develop.  It is a distinctive political institution, the particular 
means of organizing power which societies have adopted at a particular 
stage in their evolution.194 
Indeed, Hinsley insists, the growth of the state as an institution 
dominating the world, particularly since the late 1800s “has been so 
enormous, [and] has so overshadowed all other associations, that it has 
sometimes gone far towards absorbing all the functions of society.  This 
has made it difficult for us to grasp that it [the state] is not the political 
society itself.”195  Hinsley presses this point emphatically: “the political 
institutions of societies [such as the state as a political institution] should 
not be confused with the societies themselves.”196  In order to explain this 
point, he notes that in both advanced and primitive societies, the law that 
emerges from formal political action “is never the sole code regulating 
social behaviour, and the role of citizen is but one of several roles which 
each man plays as a member of society.”197 
In short, Hinsley urges us (i) to regard the state as a political institution 
that is separate from the society that it “imposes itself on”198 and (ii) to 
understand that sovereignty is a concept that sometimes—but not always 
and seldom immediately—“emerges in the wake of the rise of the state.”199  
Furthermore, he explains that the concept of sovereignty followed “long 
after the emergence of the state” in European societies and “it has not yet 
figured at all in the history of non-European societies.”200  Hence, “while 
the emergence of the state as a form of rule is a necessary condition of the 
concept of sovereignty, it is not a sufficient condition of it.”201 
I have dwelt on Hinsley’s views because they underscore the 
tentative—what I would call the “non-essential”—character of the concept 
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of sovereignty.  In his account (which is worth knowing because of the 
reputation he has as an authority on such subjects), sovereignty (i) is 
obviously separate from and subsidiary to the state, (ii) is present and 
robust in modern history but should not be regarded as somehow having a 
monopoly over the ways of characterizing the relationship between the 
state and the exercise and expression of authority.  Recall that earlier in 
Section IC, under the subheading “default-setting sovereignty,” we saw 
that some observers urge that sovereignty is most appropriately regarded 
as also being partly optional, in the sense that states can opt out of it in 
certain circumstances.  Hinsley would presumably concur in that view and 
then double down, saying that states need not have opted into it in the first 
place, although as a practical matter most modern states have done so. 
Having set those markers in place for the relations between society, 
the state, and sovereignty, Hinsley embarks on a historical review to 
explain how the concept of sovereignty—working in some cases against 
heavy odds—has in fact achieved such strength as to dominate today’s 
globe.  His survey emphasizes the “prehistory” of the concept, including 
contributions made in the Roman period202 and in medieval Europe,203 and 
he naturally explains the roles played by figures whom I mentioned earlier, 
including Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau.204 
Hinsley then turns to international relations.  He summarizes, at the 
beginning of a chapter titled “The Concept of Sovereignty in the History 
of Relations Between States,” why sovereignty cannot apply to a level 
higher than that of the state: 
Applied to the community, in the context of the internal structure of a 
political society, the concept of sovereignty has involved the belief that 
there is an absolute political power within the community.  Applied to the 
problems which arise in the relations between political communities, its 
function has been to express the antithesis of this argument—the 
principle that internationally, over and above the collection of 
community, no supreme authority exists.205 
This should not be surprising, Hinsley explains: “The idea that there 
is a sovereign authority within the community carries with it—at least it 
leads to—the idea that this authority is one among other authorities ruling 
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in other communities in the same sovereign way.”206  Consequently, in the 
international context the concept of sovereignty has “denied that there 
exists above the community a supreme power.”207 
Hinsley seems somewhat bemused, therefore, at the fact that mighty 
efforts have been made to reach a different outcome, in which sovereignty 
could somehow be applied to, or found in, some authority outside and 
above the state.  He explains such efforts as they appeared in Rome and in 
Medieval Europe208—especially as they centered on the theories of the ius 
civile, the ius gentium, the ius fetiale, and ius natural,209 and how they 
evolved into the highly influential formulation offered by Hugo Grotius, 
who found a structure of binding rules among states in the blend of ius 
gentium voluntarium (derived from human positive law) and a “law of 
nature” whose character “Grotius left . . . ambiguous” but which seemed 
to consist mainly of “the general principles that conformed to the best 
elements in man.”210  Grotius, Hinsley notes, “was the first man to insist 
on the need for a body of positive international law, separate from the 
natural law and deriving from the will and practice of states”; in this way, 
Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis “was the first systematic treatise on this 
[international] law.”211 
But Grotius was not able to find or create universal sovereignty.  
Hinsley explains that the “problem which [lay] at the root of Grotius’s 
confusion” was this: Given the fact “that the international society lacked 
the legal sanctions which served [to enforce rules] in the single state, [and 
that] it lacked the single state’s legislative, judicial and government organs 
and its social cohesion, . . . [w]here in a world of sovereign states was 
[some higher form of] restraint to be discovered” that would constitute 
something like the sovereignty found in the individual states?212  Nowhere, 
Hinsley would answer.  As a consequence, “the frequent lament since the 
eighteenth century . . . [is] that in a hundred or one hundred and fifty or 
even two hundred and fifty years the ideas of men like Grotius . . . have 
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had little or no influence on the practice of states.”213 
Hinsley explains that despite the fact that the concept of state 
sovereignty excludes, by its own logic, the discovery or imposition of 
some authority higher than the state, efforts have been made, especially in 
times of global crisis, to fight against this logic.  In some cases, the efforts 
have reflected opinions in favor of “limit[ing] or even abolish[ing] the 
sovereign independence of the separate state by institutional means.”214  
This opinion, he says, “played a decisive part in shaping the League of 
Nations.”215  That institution failed, Hinsley says, because “it sought . . . 
to avoid . . . the recurrence of war, by the suppression or the limitation by 
external means of the sovereignty of the individual state at a time when 
the outstanding development of recent history had been the increase in the 
power, the scope and the efficiency of the individual state.”216 
In Hinsley’s view, the UN “has as yet been no less a failure” than the 
League was217—again, because of the continuing vitality of the concept of 
sovereignty.  Hinsley was writing during the Cold War (the second edition 
of his book was published in 1986, revising the original 1966 edition), and 
his view of the continuing vitality of sovereignty also appears in the last 
pages of his book, where he commented on the conflict between the U.S. 
and the USSR, the two superpowers of the day.218  According to Hinsley, 
the strength of the concept of sovereignty could be seen in the fact that 
“their [actual] abstention from war with each other for the past forty 
years”219 is based on an informal “doctrine of peaceful co-existence . . . 
[which] pronounces that while rivalries are inevitable between societies 
having different structures and different ideologies, those rivalries must 
for ever be kept short of war by the states.”220  With what seems to be an 
air of resigned realism, Hinsley remarks that “this is not much to go on.”221 
Writing about a decade and a half more recently than Hinsley, Stephen 
Krasner reflects some later developments but underscores the same 
conflict between the realities of sovereignty and the desires (by some) of 
global regulation of state power.  In a book that Krasner wrote two years 
before his Problematic Sovereignty book (discussed above in Section IC1 
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of this Article), Krasner gives this overview of the current status of 
sovereignty: 
Some analysts have argued that sovereignty is being eroded by one 
aspect of the contemporary international system, globalization, and 
others that it is being sustained . . . by . . . the mutual recognition and 
shared expectations generated by international society.  Some have 
pointed out that the scope of state authority has increased over time, and 
others that the ability of the state to exercise effective control is eroding.  
Some have suggested that new norms, such as universal human rights, 
represent a fundamental break with the past, while others see these 
values as merely a manifestation of the preferences of the powerful.222 
Krasner then explains that this “muddle” in the manner in which 
various analysts view sovereignty in today’s world “reflects the fact that 
the term ‘sovereignty’ has been used in different ways.”223  He elaborates 
by emphasizing the four variants seen earlier: international legal 
sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and 
interdependence sovereignty.224  The second of those—Westphalian 
sovereignty, which occupies most of his attention in his 1999 book on 
sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy”—refers to “political organization 
based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within 
a given territory.”225 
A central theme Krasner develops is that Westphalian sovereignty has 
been widely surrendered—so much so that it is rather hypocritical to 
continue regarding it as conceptually valid in today’s world.  For instance, 
he asserts that “[i]nternational financial institutions [IFIs], such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have institutionalized 
and routinized practices that are inconsistent with Westphalian autonomy” 
because those IFIs “do not simply offer funds on the condition that they 
be repaid; they extend resources only if borrowers are willing to accept 
changes in their domestic policies and often institutional structures as 
well.”226 
Human rights, Krasner writes, can also be seen as an area in which 
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Westphalian sovereignty has been violated.227  Indeed, Krasner asserts, 
Westphalian sovereignty has been surrendered through bargaining “that 
affected basic constitutional structures, not just specific institutions or 
policies” such as human rights.228  In this regard, Krasner explains that 
“American practices in Italy and Germany after the Second World War 
involved contracts with national leaders that were designed to promote 
democratic regimes, or at least to exclude or repress Communist influence; 
national leaders invited the influence of their American counterparts.”229 
Some instances of bargained-away Westphalian sovereignty resulted 
not just in a limitation in the discretion of national leaders (restricting their 
ability to mistreat minorities, for instance, or to undermine democratic 
processes) but also in a sharing or blending of sovereignty.  This appears, 
Krasner posits, in the case of the EU, which he says “has been created 
through contracts entered into by the rulers of the European states,” who 
have thereby “establish[ed] new policies and institutional arrangements, 
some of which transcend territorial boundaries and compromise their 
domestic autonomy.”230 
A similar instance of shared or blended authority emerging from what 
Krasner considers a bargaining away of Westphalian sovereignty appears 
in the case of the law of the sea.  Specifically, the rules established in the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea permit a coastal 
state to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).231  “Within the EEZ [a 
coastal state does] . . . have authority over mineral and fishing resources, 
but . . . [it does] not have control over shipping.”232  Krasner argues that 
although this EEZ regime “does not violate autonomy” because “there is 
no exercise of external authority, . . . it does violate territoriality by 
creating an area within which states have authority over some issues but 
not others.”233 
What Krasner offers in these illustrations is a body of evidence 
supporting one of the overarching themes of his book—that what he calls 
“Westphalian sovereignty” should be regarded as an “example[] of 
organized hypocrisy,” in the sense that even though the concept makes 
sense and is regarded as highly important, it has persistently been 
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violated.234 
But how can it be true that both (i) Westphalian sovereignty is widely 
accepted as at least a rhetorically strong and vibrant concept of central 
importance to the international system and (ii) Westphalian sovereignty is 
regularly violated?  Krasner explains that the so-called “English school” 
of thought asserts that international norms such as those encompassed by 
“Westphalian sovereignty” can persist despite frequent violations because 
“an international society is the product of a shared civilization” for which 
“there must be ‘an international social consciousness, a world-wide 
community sentiment.’”235  Krasner elaborates on what this “English 
school” view asserts about where such an “international social 
consciousness” can be found in today’s world: 
For the English school, . . . [t]he contemporary sovereign state system is 
a product of beliefs that are rooted in Christian notions of natural law.  
These European concepts have spread, to one extent or another, to other 
areas of the world.  Where there is no shared civilization, no shared sense 
of values, there is no international society, although there may be an 
international system, a situation in which there is interaction but no 
constraining norms.  According to the English school, there were, for 
instance, no common rules affecting relations between Genghis Khan 
and those he conquered, between the Spanish and the Aztecs, or between 
the Christian and Moslem worlds.236 
Krasner questions the validity, though, of the “English school” view 
that today’s international system—unlike those that existed at the times of 
Genghis Khan or the Spanish invasion of Aztec civilization or the early 
rise and expansion of Islam—enjoys some sort of shared values or taken-
for-granted norms.  “It is . . . difficult,” he writes, “to find any practices in 
the international system that are consistent with the notion that there are 
some norms that are taken for granted . . . .  Rules as apparently 
uncontested as the treatment of diplomats have been grossly violated,” as 
in the case of Iran’s seizure in the late 1970s of the U.S. diplomats.237  This 
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and other incidents leave Krasner convinced “that the shared norms and 
internalized constraints stipulated by the English school do not exist.”238 
For this reason, along with others that Krasner explores, he concludes 
that sovereignty—at least what he calls “Westphalian sovereignty” and 
“international legal sovereignty”—should be regarded merely as 
“examples of organized hypocrisy”: “Their defining rules have endured 
and been widely recognized and endorsed but, at the same time, sometimes 
compromised—in the case of Westphalian sovereignty, frequently 
compromised.”239 
Why does this matter?  That is, why might we care that Krasner applies 
the label “organized hypocrisy” to the type of sovereignty that we are 
examining here?  Because Krasner has a highly-respected reputation in the 
area of international relations generally and has drawn his conclusions 
after undertaking a careful study based on extensive scholarly literature 
and professional experience.  His “sovereignty as hypocrisy” views, as set 
forth in a work that was followed two years later by his Problematic 
Sovereignty book, add further weight to the sentiments explored thus far 
in this Article, namely that sovereignty is definitionally sloppy, frequently 
disregarded or set aside, most popular in its coarse and distasteful “macho” 
form, and extremely difficult to defend (despite Stankiewicz’s efforts to 
do so, as explained above in Section IB2) against charges that it is 
absolutist, anachronistic, and otherwise unsuitable for use in the modern 
world. 
IF2.  Lansing and Laski: Views From a Century Ago 
Disagreements and uncertainties over sovereignty—what it means, 
what values it protects, what innovations it suppresses—are hardly new.  
Before bringing this analysis of sovereignty to a close, it is worth looking 
briefly at two views of sovereignty from a century ago.  One comes from 
Robert Lansing, an American lawyer who served as legal advisor to the 
U.S. Department of State at the time of the First World War, and later as 
Secretary of State under President Woodrow Wilson.240  Before that, 
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Lansing had built his reputation as an authority on international law by 
serving as counsel for the U.S.A. in various boundary and fisheries 
arbitrations; he also served as an editor of the American Journal of 
International Law.  The other set of views comes from Harold Laski, a 
British economist, politician, and lecturer who became a widely known 
intellectual spokesman for socialism in the years between the two world 
wars.  Laski lectured in history at Harvard, McGill, and Yale Universities 
and wrote widely on sovereignty, authority, and political theory generally. 
In his Notes on Sovereignty, written between 1907 and 1921 and 
collected for publication in 1921, Robert Lansing offers several key points.  
First, he asserts that sovereignty is essential to society: “The organization 
of a political society without the operation of sovereignty is as 
incomprehensible as a creation without a creator, as a thought without the 
mind from which it sprung.”241  Second, although he acknowledges the 
difficulties inherent in providing a definition of something so fundamental 
as sovereignty, Lansing “defines sovereignty in its broadest sense as the 
power to do all things without accountability.”242  Third, from that broad 
definition, he offers refinements involving discussions of “Divine 
sovereignty” and then “human sovereignty” —the latter of which he 
defines as “the power to the extent of human capacity to do all things on 
the earth without accountability”243 and which he says “prevails in a 
state.”244 
With these efforts to define the scope of sovereignty, Lansing then 
describes its substance.  For this, he focuses on force.  “Sovereignty is 
real,” he writes, “only when the possessor can compel the obedience . . . 
of every individual composing the political state and within the territorial 
state.”245  Moreover, this power to compel obedience “necessarily arises 
from the possession of physical force superior to any other such force in 
the state” and indeed it is “the application or the menace of brute force,” 
he asserts, that is involved in the exercise of sovereignty in a state, with 
regard for “rational, equitable, and ethical ideas” being only 
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“discretionary” on the part of the possessor of sovereignty.246 
Those views reflect a hearty embrace of positivism as espoused by 
John Austin.  Indeed, Lansing cites Austin in asserting that “law in a state 
is a rule of human conduct emanating from the sovereign.”247  This 
Austinian view has been largely abandoned in the last century, as have 
some other propositions that might strike us as curious today.  For 
instance, Lansing offers these observations: 
The body of individuals [possessing sovereignty] in a state . . . is not 
restrained in any way . . . in declaring the fundamental law of the state.  
They may, indeed, if they so will, [take actions] which are manifestly 
unjust and immoral.  It is not at all a question of right, but a question of 
power. . . . 
As it is impossible, except when actual physical strife occurs in a state, 
to determine with certainty who are and who are not the possessors of 
the real sovereignty, there are certain qualifications which have been 
assumed in modern states to be evidence of an individual’s right to share 
in the exercise of the sovereignty. 
These qualifications are usually based, whether intentionally or not, upon 
the presumptive physical strength of the individual.  They are as follows: 
First, Sovereign [sic] rights are confined to males, because . . . females 
are physically inferior and therefore powerless to maintain such rights 
by force.  Second, The [sic] males are also limited to those who are 
presumed to have attained full bodily vigor, which is assumed to be when 
they have reached a certain age.248 
Having thus asserted that sovereignty rests entirely on power, not 
right, and that it cannot involve participation by females, and likewise that 
it cannot involve participation by minors, Lansing draws an analogy 
between (i) individual human beings in a state and (ii) the states, 
territories, and colonies that comprise a federal system such as the U.S.: 
[T]he individual states in a federal state like the United States stand in 
the same relation to the federal sovereignty that the male citizens of legal 
age stand to the sovereignty in a single state.  To carry the analogy further 
in the case of the United States—the territories of the United States are 
similar to citizens of the male sex in a single state, who are minors, but 
                                                          
 246.   Id. 
 247.   Id. at 45 (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 79 (Robert Campbell ed., 
London, John Murray, 5th ed. 1885).  In particular, Lansing quotes Austin’s assertion that “[l]aws 
proper, or properly so called, are commands.”  Id.  Other observers have characterized Austin’s view 
of law as a set of orders issued by a sovereign and backed by force or the threat of force. H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18–20 (1960).  
 248.   LANSING, supra note 241, at 20–21. 
2019 ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 779 
who will in time attain to equality in sovereign rights; and colonies are 
like the females in a state, who owe it allegiance but lack the inherent 
qualities to become possessors of the sovereignty.249 
To most readers in the early twenty-first century, the views that 
Lansing presents from the early twentieth century seem antiquated and 
perhaps offensive.  Some other views he expresses might, on the other 
hand appear naïve or imperialistic, depending on one’s perspective.  
Having discussed “the characteristics of qualities of the sovereignty which 
finds expression in a state,” Lansing then turns his attention to “the more 
extensive type of sovereignty which affects politically the entire human 
race and territorially the whole earth.”250 
In this regard, Lansing seems to endorse the view “which sees in the 
world but a single social organism [that is] all-inclusive and universal” and 
that possesses “a sovereignty that is superior to the sovereignty in a 
state.”251  Lansing acknowledges that such sovereignty is only “unformed 
and necessarily a theoretical conception” at the time he was writing, but 
he says that “powerful political and moral influences are at work in the 
world to change the theory into practice”—and an appreciation of this fact 
“compels the conviction that the entire human race ought to be considered, 
and in fact is, a single community, which awaits the further development 
of modern civilization to complete its organization and make of all 
mankind a great, universal political state.”252  Already, Lansing asserts, in 
the currently “unorganized mass of humanity there must be a certain body 
of individuals possessing a physical might sufficient to compel obedience 
by every member of the human race throughout the world.  Such superior 
physical might constitutes sovereignty, and, since its only limit is the earth, 
it may properly be termed World Sovereignty.”253 
From this assertion that there is a strong momentum toward world 
sovereignty, Lansing draws what might be a logical conclusion: the 
expression of such world sovereignty will be “the organization of a World 
State —an idea that he says has been envisioned many times in the past 
but has not been possible until the present age (that is, the early twentieth 
century when Lansing was writing).254  As evidence of the momentum 
(what he calls the “tendency of modern thought”) toward such a world 
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state, Lansing points to the fact that the individual nations of the world had 
already largely accepted the “fiction” of legal equality of states.255 
Lansing’s views on sovereignty and global unity were not shared, of 
course, by all of his contemporaries.  Harold Laski offers a sharp contrast.  
Writing in 1916, Laski opens his book Studies in the Problem of 
Sovereignty256 with a broadside attack on assertions of global unity and 
world sovereignty.257  After acknowledging, with citations to Hegel, 
Dante, and two Catholic popes, the strong appeal that such ideas of unity 
and concentration of power and loyalty do hold for some persons,258 Laski 
dismisses these ideas as both unrealistic and, on careful reflection, 
repulsive.259  Put simply, our loyalties, our allegiances, our identities, are 
not monolithic but pluralistic. 
In the event of a great war, for example, as a member of the State you 
may be called upon to fight; as a member of another group, the Quakers, 
you may be called upon to resist that demand.  It seems clear that little is 
gained by talk of ‘over-riding demands,’ of saying, for instance, that the 
demands of the State are all-important.  They are all-important only to 
the State.  The history of societies fatally contradicts the view that in a 
crisis only the State will have power of compulsion.  What of certain 
miners in South Wales?  What of certain Unionists in Ulster?  Of militant 
suffragists?  Did not to them the wills of certain groups other than the 
State conflict with it and prove more intense in their demand?260 
Laski then makes a frontal attack also on positivism.  As noted above, 
Robert Lansing relied heavily on John Austin’s form of positivism in 
asserting that law is “a rule of human conduct emanating from the 
sovereign.”261  Laski dismisses this as nonsense.  Law “clearly is not a 
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command,” he says.  Instead, “[w]here sovereignty prevails, where the 
State acts, it acts by the consent of men”262 and not because of force. 
If, for example, Parliament chose to enact that no Englishman should be 
a Roman Catholic, it would certainly fail to carry the statute into effect.  
We have, therefore, to find the true meaning of sovereignty not in the 
coercive power possessed by its instrument, but in the fused good-will 
for which it stands.  Men accept its dictates either because their own will 
finds part expression there or because, assuming the goodness of 
intention which lies behind it, they are content, usually, not to resist its 
imposition.263 
For Laski, then, the concept of a unitary, absolutist, all-powerful state 
with a heavily-muscled form of sovereignty that shoulders aside all 
competing loyalties and authorities “runs counter to some of the deepest 
convictions we can possess.”264  Discarding that “monistic” view in favor 
of what he calls a “pluralistic theory” would, Laski argues, be in keeping 
with “the consistent disruption of absolutisms” that he says has occurred 
in both “the realm of philosophy” and “the sphere of politics.”265  He 
presses further: 
The history of recorded experience seems to show that this kind of 
dogma [i.e., clinging to absolutisms such as the monistic view of state 
sovereignty] is the stumbling-block in the way of all progress.  The State 
has sovereign rights; and those who manipulate it will too often cause it 
to be used for the protection of existing rights.  The two get identified; 
the dead hand of effete ancestralism falls with a resounding thud on the 
living hopes of to-day.266 
Laski acknowledges how radical a departure it is that he is proposing 
from Hobbesian views of sovereignty and from the prevailing view of state 
authority.  After all, Laski’s pluralistic theory suggests that whatever 
loyalty individuals will show toward the state in whose territory they live 
is ultimately voluntary in nature, based on their view of how creditworthy 
that state’s actions are.  And anarchy poses a threat to sovereignty.267 
I am well enough aware that in any such voluntarism as this room is left 
for a hint of anarchy.  To discredit the State seems like enough to 
dethroning it.  And when the voice of the State is viewed as the deliberate 
expression of public opinion it seems like the destruction of the one 
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uniquely democratic basis we have thus far attained.  But the objection, 
like the play queen in Hamlet, protests too much.  It assumes the 
homogeneity of public opinion, and of that homogeneity not even the 
most stout-hearted of us could adduce the proof.  Nor is its absence [that 
is, the absence of homogeneity in public opinion, actually a] defect.  On 
the contrary, it seems to me that it is essentially a sign that real thought 
is present.  A community that can not agree is already a community 
capable of advance. . . . 
I imagine the absolute Hobbes, who has seen internal dissension tear a 
great kingdom in pieces, holds up hands of horror at such division of 
power.  [Still, it is difficult to agree] with that prince of monistic 
thinkers. . . .  [After all, it] is from the selection of variations, not from 
the preservation of uniformity, that progress is born . . . .  We shall make 
the basis of our State consent to disagreement.  Therein shall we ensure 
its deepest harmony.268 
Fortunately for us, Laski gives direct attention to federalism.  In a 
special appendix offering “a note on sovereignty and federalism,” he 
asserts that the U.S. Constitution actually declines “to erect an instrument 
of sovereign power” for the country.269  In the U.S. system, Laski writes, 
“[w]e do not know who rules.  Certainly the president is not absolute.  
Neither to Congress nor to the Supreme Court is unlimited power 
decreed.”270  Faced, he says, with the challenge of reconciling sovereign 
claims from both (i) the national authorities and (ii) the individual 
constituent states, “[t]he [founding] fathers reconciled these opposites by 
abolishing altogether any notion of Austinian sovereignty.”271  Even the 
Constitution itself, Laski urges, is a narrowly limiting instrument that by 
its very nature—written, specific, and rigid—flies in the face of a full-
throated sovereignty that Austin and his adherents would grant to the 
state.272 
Then Laski sums up his views.  He says that “sovereignty, rightly 
regarded, ought not to be defined as omnicompetence at all.”273  Instead, 
its exercise is “an act of will behind which there is such power as to make 
the expectation of obedience reasonable” but not a foregone conclusion.274  
Regarded in this way, sovereignty “is, after all, not such a very formidable 
thing”; and specifically, “the sovereignty of the state does not in reality 
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differ from the power exercised by a Church or a trade union”275  In the 
end, he says, “[w]e begin to see the State as akin to that medieval empire 
which was above all a community of communities.  The sovereign appears 
as a thing consistently to revere rather than as a thing undeviatingly to 
obey.”276 
IG. Negotiated Innovation and Pluralistic Sovereignty 
Imagine Robert Lansing reading Harold Laski’s account of 
sovereignty.  Lansing would have found it alarming, maybe even goofy.  
As Laski himself said, Hobbes would probably “hold up hands of horror” 
at Laski’s pluralist and rather casual view of sovereignty.  Some of the 
authorities I have surveyed thus far in this Article would doubtless do the 
same—W. J. Stankiewicz comes to mind, given the ambitious defense of 
traditional sovereignty that he mounted.277  For those observers, 
sovereignty is real, robust, muscular, monolithic, and crucial to the 
international system. 
Laski’s dramatically different view, though, would also attract many 
endorsements.  Whatever they might think of Laski’s political views more 
generally,278 some of the observers I have cited above—Jens Bartelson,279 
Jacques Maritain, 280 Staley Benn,281 Kenneth Cole,282 and Stephen 
Krasner283 come to mind in particular—would probably find Laski’s 
hundred-year-old views on sovereignty quite palatable and (as I do) rather 
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refreshing.  Indeed, maybe even Thomas Heller and Abraham Sofaer, 
viewing sovereignty from their international-law-practitioner perspective, 
would find themselves agreeing with Laski’s emphasis on pluralism, at 
least to the degree that such pluralism reflects the notions of 
“interdependent sovereignty”284 and the process by which “certain aspects 
of sovereign power are shared or relocated.”285 
Even so, the fact remains that in general discourse the concept of 
sovereignty retains tremendous power.  For many of its proponents, 
especially advocates of what I referred to above as “macho 
sovereignty,”286 sovereignty constitutes—both in its exercise and its 
defense—a high-pressure, high-profile, high-energy, high-stakes affair.  
Those persons are unlikely to be moved to discard the term “sovereignty” 
and the concept they think it names, even in the face of evidence that it is 
definitionally sloppy, historically suspect, frequently disregarded or set 
aside, and widely unattractive for its embrace of monolithic power and its 
fealty to absolutism. 
Given this reality, any attempt to proffer a new version of sovereignty 
that would reflect the circumstances of the modern age—and that would, 
perhaps more importantly, anticipate a new age in which agriculture is 
practiced differently and environmental restoration is a fundamental and 
non-derogable value—probably needs to retain the term “sovereignty” in 
some respect.  As an acknowledgement of that fact, I have settled on the 
term “pluralistic sovereignty.”  Let me offer the following one-paragraph 
synopsis before giving some further attention to sovereignty’s sister-
concept, which is the concept of the so-called nation-state. 
Instead of a concept of sovereignty based on an assumption of 
autonomous territorial isolation and on the pretension of a singular 
nationality, a new and more realistic version of sovereignty for today’s 
world would be pluralistic in its outlook—both (i) in the expectation that 
authority over specific territories of the Earth’s surface would be shared 
and blended (as is already true in important respects and becoming 
increasingly so for good reason) and (ii) in the realization that multiple 
types of authorities (not just so-called “nation-states” of the sort emerging 
from European circumstances of several centuries ago) can naturally and 
legitimately exercise sovereignty.  Such a “pluralistic sovereignty” would 
rest on the two pillars of innovation and negotiation, in the sense that it 
would both (i) aggressively seek new solutions, including technological 
solutions, to governance issues in an increasingly complex and integrated 
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world, and (ii) result from participation by an unprecedented breadth of 
persons and entities whose interests are to be taken into account in 
addressing such governance issues.  Ultimately, the “pluralistic 
sovereignty” that would emerge from such negotiated innovation has as its 
aim to create and reflect a governance structure that would have a set of 
entities, loyalties, authorities, and responsibilities suitable for the modern 
age—with special attention to the existential ecological crises that this 
modern age presents. 
To that one-paragraph synopsis of what I call “pluralistic 
sovereignty,” let me add two other brief points before turning to my 
discussion of the nation-state.  The first point is historical in character; the 
second focuses on the climate crisis and the agriculture crisis. 
Historically, a system of “pluralistic sovereignty” would resemble the 
political and social landscape found in Europe before the rise of the nation-
state, when people found themselves answering to numerous cross-cutting 
loyalties.  In that setting, these loyalties might run simultaneously to a 
local prince, a more distant king, the parish priest, a group of village elders, 
and perhaps a guild—all of which were recognized as having some rule-
making authority over specified subject-matters.287  My view of 
“pluralistic sovereignty” is similar: authoritative rules would emerge from 
(and be enforced by) more than one entity, depending on the subject-
matter at issue. 
Environmental protection is a specific subject-matter of primary 
concern to me in this regard.  Given the crisis I see in our present form of 
agriculture—a matter I have explored in detail elsewhere288—coupled with 
the related emergency that we face in the way of unprecedented climate 
disruption,289 I believe “monolithic sovereignty” falls short.  Effective and 
authoritative sources of rule-making and rule-enforcement should be 
established to address these existential challenges.  Indeed, looking 
beyond the concept of sovereignty to the concept of the nation-state, I find 
the latter entirely adequate for meeting these challenges, and I have 
                                                          
 287.   For a discussion of “pluralism” in a legal sense before the rise of powerful nation-states, see 
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proposed a parallel structure—that of the “eco-state.”  Let us turn to that 
topic now. 
II. OVERCOMING THE ANACHRONISM OF THE STATE AND NATIONALISM 
What I have tried to establish in Part I of this Article is that the concept 
of sovereignty is deeply flawed, historically anachronistic, impossible to 
define effectively, and worthy of dismissal.  Its saving grace, if any, is that 
the sheer persistence of the concept of sovereignty (for now, at least) in 
the vocabulary of international law and international relations augurs 
against discarding it entirely and toward adopting instead a notion of 
“pluralistic sovereignty” that reflects what I have called “negotiated 
innovation” in establishing various forms of political organization and 
authority in the world.  As I have explained in a preliminary way 
elsewhere, the exercise of such “pluralistic sovereignty” in the context of 
agriculture and environmental restoration would involve introducing a 
novel fundamental political unit—what I call the “eco-state.”290  Because 
traditional sovereignty has been exercised by the so-called “nation-state,” 
I turn for the remainder of this Article to an examination of that concept, 
as well as the concept of nationalism that lies at its heart. 
I use the somewhat disparaging adjective “so-called” (that is, the “so-
called” nation-state) because what my examination reveals, among other 
things, is that there really is no such thing, technically speaking, as a true 
nation-state.  More important, though, than this matter of terminology is 
the fact that the nation-state as a concept is the obsolete remnant of a long-
past era that bears little resemblance to today’s world.  It shares this 
characteristic with sovereignty.  It also shares another characteristic with 
sovereignty: the concept of the nation-state, like the ideology of 
nationalism that lies at its heart, does us more disservice than service 
because it involves serious flaws that distort our understanding of modern 
international relations and how they can be improved.  These and other 
points I explain in the following paragraphs, beginning with the concept 
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of nationalism. 
IIA. Nationalism and Its Dark Side 
In an excellent book dating from the year 2000, Michael Hechter 
examines the nature and behavior of nationalism.291  In doing so, he offers 
a clear definition of “nation” and of “nationalism”—while acknowledging 
the difficulty of doing so—and he addresses three particular issues.292  
First, why is nationalism a recent phenomenon, dating back only for two 
or three centuries?293  Second, why does nationalism emerge differently in 
different circumstances—that is, strong and insistent in some, much less 
so (or not at all) in others?294  Third, how can the “dark side” of 
nationalism—that is, its tendency toward violence—be contained?  (This 
third question provides the title for his book: Containing Nationalism).295 
IIA1.  Defining Nationalism and Its Relatives 
Each of these three questions bears on our inquiry here, which focuses 
especially on sovereignty, authority, and governance.  After all, the desire 
for some form of self-rule or at least a high degree of self-determination 
or self-governance, lies at the center of Hechter’s definition of 
nationalism.  He asserts that “nationalism” (a term he says first appeared 
in 1774)296 means “collective action designed to render the boundaries of 
the nation congruent with those of its governance unit.”297 
Naturally, that definition requires further definitions, particularly of 
“nation” and “governance unit.”  Hechter urges that although “the terms 
‘nation’ and ‘state’ are often used interchangeably, . . . nationalism cannot 
be understood when the meanings of these two terms are not kept 
distinct.”298  Tracing the word “nation” to the Latin verb nasci (to be born), 
Hechter explains that “the term ‘nation’ originally designated a group of 
people who were born in the same place.”299  More recently, though, a 
broad consensus has emerged as to what “nation” means in today’s world: 
“Whatever else it may consist of, the term nation refers to a relatively large 
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group of genetically unrelated people with high solidarity.”300 
As for “governance unit,” Hechter refers to “that territorial unit which 
is responsible for providing the bulk of social order and other collective 
grounds—including protection from confiscation, justice and welfare—to 
its members.”301  He emphasizes that although many governance units in 
today’s world are states, this has not always been true (he reminds us that 
“in classic feudalism the mantle of governance falls to the manor”),302 and 
it is only partially true even now. 
It is at this juncture that Hechter first emphasizes the significance of 
federal systems.  Noting first that in a few countries, such as France, the 
governance unit is the central state (so that the content and schedule of 
public-school instruction in France, for instance, is highly uniform on any 
given day), this is in fact the exception: 
In many other complex societies, however, governance tasks are carried 
out simultaneously in different territorial units.  Since governance in 
federal systems always involves more than one level of decision-making, 
its locus is much more difficult to ascertain.  In the United States, for 
example, the Federal government is responsible for the provision of 
defence and, ultimately, of justice.  But state governments are 
responsible for providing some collective goods (including higher 
education, freeway maintenance, and aid to dependent children), 
whereas still others (including policing, fire protection and elementary 
education) are the responsibility of municipalities, or even smaller units 
such as local school districts.  Since the allocation of powers between 
various levels of government has always engendered intense political 
conflict, it is no easy task to determine where the bulk of governance 
occurs in a polity like the United States.303 
With these specific definitions of “nation” and “governance unit,” and 
particularly with the suggestion that it is often difficult in federal systems 
to determine precisely what is the “governance unit” (the upper level of 
the federal government? a lower level?), it is not unusual for nationalism 
to emerge in such federal systems.  This is an important point in my 
examination of the mechanisms that might be used at the international 
level to ensure global agroecological integrity.  After all, the international 
legal system in place since World War II is to some degree a federal system 
in which some rules and functions—peace-keeping, for instance, and some 
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elements of economic management—are collectivized in international 
organizations that have nearly universal membership by states.  In those 
respects, then, at least the intended “governance unit” is a federal one with 
many powers remaining with states but a few powers delegated broadly to 
the purview of one or more international organizations. 
IIA2.  Containing Nationalism 
This being the case, Hechter’s views on nationalism—and particularly 
his third question about how to “contain the dark side” of nationalism 
(bringing discord and violence)—hold direct relevance to any effort to 
design a system that is more effective than the current one is at providing 
urgently-needed protections of the ecosphere.  What does Hechter regard 
as the best method for gaining broad support for a centralization of certain 
key public goods?  He offers this answer: 
The best hope for containing the destructive elements of nationalism 
therefore hinges on conditions that decrease the demand for sovereignty 
among national groups.  Such groups demand sovereignty to enact a 
governance structure that is more accountable to them.  Whereas 
distinctive national values will tend to persist, the responsiveness of 
central states to these distinctive values can be affected by institutional 
arrangements that, at least in principle, are modifiable. . . .  [I]nstitutions 
which increase the central state’s accountability to national minorities 
should reduce the demand for sovereignty, and hence the potential for 
nationalist conflict.304 
Hechter then explains that “[w]ould-be institutional designers have 
several prominent ideas to consider on this score: [1] consociationalism, 
[2] electoral laws, and [3] that variant of indirect rule known as 
federation.”305  He deals quickly with “consociationalism,” in which 
“leaders of the various nations participate in decision-making as a cartel,” 
with each leader “armed with veto powers.”306  Such a system, which 
Hechter says has prevailed (and gained praise) in Switzerland, attracts 
criticism on grounds that (i) the veto power “is a recipe for governmental 
inaction,” (ii) “it avoids popular participation,” in part because (iii) “it 
relies on élite bargaining carried out in secrecy.”307 
Electoral laws, Hechter explains, can overcome some of 
consociationalism’s deficiencies, but they introduce more of their own 
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shortcomings.308  By “electoral laws,” or what he more precisely calls an 
“electoral system,” Hechter means a system that “translate[s] electoral 
votes” by the public directly “into parliamentary seats” and thereby 
assures that “representatives are held accountable by [their] 
constituents.”309  Whatever other merits such a system may have, Hechter 
says, it “may not necessarily reduce intergroup conflict”310—that is, it does 
little to suppress the “dark side” of nationalism. 
Hechter then turns his attention to “that form of indirect rule known 
as federation” or what is also commonly called federalism: 
Federation is an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign 
state, that is distinguished from other such states solely by the fact that 
its central government incorporates regional units into its decision 
procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis. . . .  Federations all 
employ indirect rule, but their forms can vary widely.  For example, the 
degree to which federal units are formally equal is always an empirical 
question (in the United States, for example, the Rhode Island voter for 
the Senate has twenty times the power that her California counterpart 
has).  Further, federations have different degrees and types of 
decentralization.311 
Nothing about Hechter’s definition, of course, is surprising.  Most 
readers will be familiar with federalism.  What warrants attention, 
however, in Hechter’s assessment is this: Federalism can, he says, both (i) 
intensify nationalist conflict and (ii) inhibit nationalist conflict.312  
Federalism might stimulate nationalist conflict, Hechter explains, 
“because it provides potential nationalist leaders with patronage and other 
resources that can be mobilized for nationalist ends.”313  Beyond that, 
federalism “may have cognitive implications”: when a group is treated as 
a subsidiary unit of a larger, federal political entity, that group is 
encouraged “to think and act according to national categories,” thereby 
regarding itself as having a distinct (national) identity.314  As evidence of 
federalism’s tendency to stimulate nationalist conflict, Hechter cites the 
U.S.A. (the “Civil War broke out in a federation”), Pakistan (which, in its 
early days as a federation, “lost Bangladesh”), and the three main “socialist 
states to dissolve following the climactic year of 1989,” namely the Soviet 
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Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—all of which “also just happened 
to be federations.”315 
On the other hand, federalism can inhibit nationalist conflict.  After 
all, federalism “involves the devolution of (at least some) decision-making 
to localities” thereby “increas[ing] local self-governance” on the part of 
the federation’s constituent political units and reducing each one’s 
“demand for sovereignty.”316  The implications of this reasoning, Hechter 
says, are clear: 
A constitution that minimizes the [federal] state’s control over 
disposable, transferable revenue and rights presents a very small target 
for nationalists.  It stands to reason that local politicians are less likely to 
play the nationalist card when their constituents see less benefit in [local] 
sovereignty.  [Accordingly,] to contain nationalism, the central rules of 
multinational states ought to grant political devolution to mobilized 
national minorities.317 
As evidence of how federalism can inhibit nationalist conflict, Hechter 
cites several illustrations.  One is “Britain’s [late-1990s] offer of 
devolution to Scotland and Wales . . . , with the more thoroughgoing 
devolution in Scotland more enthusiastically supported than its relatively 
anaemic Welsh counterpart.”318  Other illustrations appear, Hechter 
reports, in “Spain and Belgium [which] have recently undergone 
significant constitutional moves from unity toward federation as a means 
of resolving national conflicts.”319  And “even France—traditionally, the 
archetypal unitary state—has granted Corsica a certain amount of 
devolution.”320  In each of these and other cases that Hechter cites, “very 
significant powers have been granted to the relevant subunits” within the 
large federated state.321  As discussed above in Section IC2 of this Article, 
these instances of devolution can be seen as fitting within a larger 
landscape of constitutional and structural options that reveal a creative and 
sophisticated approach to political-governance arrangements. 
In sum, Hechter draws attention to two opposing views.  One posits 
that federalism tends to intensify nationalist conflict.  The other posits that 
federalism tends to inhibit nationalist conflict.  He explains several factors 
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that might help explain this apparent inconsistency,322 and then concludes 
by asserting that federalism works best (in the sense that the violence it 
engenders remains weakest) when a proper balance is struck between 
centralization and decentralization: 
To contain nationalistic violence, therefore, a balance must be struck 
between peripheral regions’ dependence on the centre for military and 
economic resources, and the autonomy to pursue their own production 
and consumption values.  Federation is no panacea for nationalist 
violence in relatively centralized states, but it does offer substantial hope 
for mitigating nationalism’s dark side.323 
Hechter acknowledges that striking this correct balance “is much less 
difficult to prescribe than to implement.”324  This is true, but it need not be 
overly dispiriting.  Hechter’s analysis suggests that federalism is 
workable; the rewards are potentially quite high if the proper balance of 
authorities can be struck between the central unit of governance and the 
peripheral units of governance.  While Hechter’s analysis concentrates on 
states and their subsidiary units, it offers a useful prospect also for inter-
state relations as well.  If the correct balance of authorities can be struck 
between (i) centralized functions at the international level (as with use-of-
force rules and certain economic-management rules of the sort referred to 
above in Figure 2, near the beginning of this Article and (ii) decentralized 
functions at the “lower” levels of the region, the state, the district, and the 
local units of government, then perhaps what Hechter calls the 
“nationalism’s dark side” can be contained at the global level. 
Hechter goes on to enumerate some especially important elements in 
“implementing decentralization” properly—that is, in ensuring a correct 
balance between the central and the peripheral authorities in a federal 
system.325  One such element is procedural justice: “When people think 
that a particular decision is unfair, but that the procedure that generated 
the decision was fair, they are less likely to act on that perception to change 
the outcome.  Procedures perceived as fair can significantly influence 
perceptions of the fairness of a specific outcome.”326  Moreover, Hechter 
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writes, procedures are regarded as fair if they entail adequate checks and 
balances, provide ample “voice” by various stakeholders in the decision-
making process, and seem to be neutral, accurate, transparent, and 
thorough in their application.327 
In addition to procedural justice, though, Hechter emphasizes that 
minority cultural protections are also essential to implementing 
decentralization in a system.328  He insists that “[t]he best means of 
instituting minority cultural protectionism is by making the, admittedly, 
counterintuitive, claim that the majority will profit from it.”329  The most 
persuasive way of making this claim is to explain “that peripheral 
autonomy is desirable simply because it preserves cultural diversity.”330  
He likens cultural diversity’s benefits to biodiversity’s benefits: “Like 
biodiversity, cultural diversity may result in future social pay-offs that are 
impossible to foresee.”331  He acknowledges how strong the argument 
seems that cultural diversity “threatens political unity and social order,” 
but says that this argument “is quite mistaken: order can be provided more 
efficiently in a society made up of different national groups, each having 
distinct values, than in a culturally homogeneous society”—mainly 
because “a viable central state can profit from the social control activities 
of its constituent national groups.”332 
Let me sum up: Hechter lays out a set of key points about nationalism.  
First, he defines nationalism as “collective action designed to render the 
boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit” and 
explains that the urge for collective action (nationalism) is a recent 
phenomenon emerging from peculiarities of European history.  Second, 
nationalism manifests itself differently in different political and cultural 
settings, and this complicates the effort to contain the “dark side” of 
nationalism—that is, its tendency toward serious discontent and violence 
against central authorities that a particular nationality thinks are infringing 
on their own self-determination.  Third, although a variety of methods 
have been tried in order to prevent such discontent and violence, 
federalism holds the most promise for doing so.  Fourth, federalism will 
not work unless it is carefully designed to strike a proper balance between 
the central and the peripheral authorities.  And fifth, striking that proper 
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balance turns on such factors as procedural fairness and special protection 
of minority interests—that is, the interests of that “nation” or group that 
considers itself somehow separate in character from the larger population 
that the federal system encompasses. 
In the closing two pages of his book, Hechter offers a last reflection.  
Having explored nationalism and how to contain its “dark side,” Hechter 
speculates on the future of nationalism and of the “collective action” that 
defines it.  In particular, he suggests that a different basis for collective 
action might at some point displace nationalism: 
Although it is unlikely that nationalism will subside in the future, there 
is no reason to believe that it will be the most salient form of political 
conflict indefinitely. . . .  [Recall that] there ha[s] been a marked increase 
in direct rule—that is, in political centralization . . . [and that this has 
resulted importantly from the] development of the welfare state during 
the post-war era in Western Europe and Canada . . . .  By extending a 
wide range of entitlements, the welfare state increased citizens’ 
dependence on the central state at the expense of local authorities. . . . 
[This might all change. We] ought not be too surprised if class 
supersedes ethnicity as a basis of collective action sometime in the 
future.  Under what conditions might this reversal come to pass?  One 
possibility leaps to mind.  To the degree that alternative sources of 
welfare dry up, then organizations based on social class may be expected 
to return to the fore.  The gradual demise of the welfare state in the 
United States may revive class politics in its wake.333 
Hechter’s closing speculations add a new wrinkle to our consideration 
of nationalism: not only has it manifest itself differently in different 
settings, and not only does it present a “dark side” that needs to be 
suppressed, perhaps through a carefully-designed form of federalism.  In 
addition, economic and political developments might cause nationalism to 
be supplanted by class as the more potent force to be dealt with in 
maintaining order in the world.  If this were to occur, then it would seem 
to require us to be even more imaginative in designing a form of federalism 
that would reflect the two key elements Hechter emphasized: procedural 
fairness and special protection of minority interests. 
Let us turn our attention from nationalism to nationality.  Specifically, 
how does nationality differ as a historical, ideological, and even emotional 
matter from some related concepts? 
                                                          
 333.   Id. at 158–59 (emphasis added). 
2019 ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 795 
IIB. Nation, Country, Patria, State 
For a synopsis of how best to distinguish (maybe “disentangle” is 
more apt) the meanings of these four terms—nation, country, patria, and 
state—I turn to an elegant account written in the 1960s by Alexander 
Passerin d’Entrèves of the University of Turin.334  For d’Entrèves, a crucial 
starting-point in understanding these terms and the concepts they convey 
is to realize (i) that they have changed dramatically over time, and that (ii) 
these changes have resulted in large part from the intentional actions of 
strong political leaders. 
On the first of these points, d’Entrèves explains that “[t]he ideas of 
nation and nationality are entirely absent from the definitions of the State 
which can be found in the writings of the three great thinkers who first 
mapped out the new landscape of the modern political world”335—namely 
Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes—and in fact “the concepts of nation and 
nationality are a comparatively recent product of history.”336  This is not 
to say that no sense of national differences was present in Europe at or 
before the times of those writers (the early 1500s for Machiavelli, the latter 
1500s for Bodin, and the mid-1600s for Hobbes), but the national 
differences that were perceived then “did not lead  . . . to a denial of a 
higher unity, that of the respublica christiana”; instead, “such diversities 
were thought of as the natural differences within a large family.”337  An 
example that d’Entrèves cites involves Dante, whose writings (in the early 
1300s) show the separation between the two concepts of state and nation: 
No one could possibly deny that Dante had a very strong national feeling.  
Italy stands out in his vision as a well-defined unit, with features, a 
language, a heritage of her own.  But all his love for Italy did not prevent 
Dante from championing a supranational political programme: the unity 
of the Empire, in which he was content to reserve for his country merely 
a privileged place.338 
On the other hand, d’Entrèves explains that there were efforts by 
political leaders—especially by the “new princes” at the beginning of the 
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modern era (the sixteenth century, in his view)—“to make advantageous 
use of national consciousness . . . [and] to mould and to direct that 
consciousness to the pursuit of certain peculiar ends,” especially to 
consolidate power.339  Indeed, this is d’Entrèves’s second main point: the 
rise of a concept of nationality in Europe resulted in large part from the 
intentional actions by strong and ambitious political leaders. 
For instance, d’Entrèves asserts that the famous lines from 
Shakespeare’s Richard II referring to “[t]his blessed plot, this earth, this 
realm, this England” expresses a strong sense of English nationality that 
“found both a pattern and a stimulus in the exceptional personality of that 
typical ‘new prince’, the great Elizabeth I,” whom d’Entrèves calls a 
“master in the art of channeling the growing nationalism of her subjects 
within the range of her crude power-politics.”340 
A question then emerges: If Elizabeth I and other leaders around the 
time of Bodin and Hobbes were using the concept of the nation as 
d’Entrèves asserts, why would d’Entrèves also insist that those writers did 
not include the concept in their definitions of the state?  The answer, 
d’Entrèves explains, lies in the difference between ambition and 
description: 
[Although it might] seem rather puzzling that writers, such as 
Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes, should have passed over in silence so 
important an element as nationality in their definition of the State, . . . 
the puzzle can be explained when we remember that the convergence of 
State and nation, which had at least in part taken place in their days, was 
closely tied to the pursuit of a particular programme, and ultimately 
depended on the ‘will to power’ of the new princes and the new States.  
Any change in that programme, and the two concepts could again fall 
apart.  This is what actually happened when from national unification the 
rulers of Europe embarked on territorial expansion and on power-politics 
pure and simple.  New ideologies [that is, ideologies other than that of 
nationality] were called upon to provide justification of the State’s new 
course.341 
What d’Entrèves is describing, therefore, is nationality as a sort of 
flash in the pan, a concept that (i) sizzled loudly when political leaders (the 
European “princes,” in his terminology) found advantage in nurturing it in 
order to strengthen the powers of the state but then (ii) got suppressed 
when political circumstances shifted.  “Paradoxically, the idea of 
nationality seems to suffer eclipse at the very moment when the modern 
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State was coming of age and the map of Europe was taking its familiar 
shape.  Eighteenth-century statesmen neatly severed the practice of 
politics from nationalistic emotions.”342 
It is at this point in his account that d’Entrèves introduces the notions 
of “country” and “patria.”343  In order to explain how the idea of the nation 
was manipulated for political purposes by the European “princes” in hopes 
of securing some political legitimation for the state, d’Entrèves 
distinguishes four terms—nationalism, nationality, country, and patria—
in a succinct way: 
Nationalism transformed nationality from an historical fact into a 
political ideology, into the one exclusive principle of legitimation of the 
State.  In order to do so it was necessary to affirm not only that nations 
existed as separate and well-determined units, but that national unity was 
an ideal to be sought after and fostered, and that the only ‘good’ State 
was the Nation-state.  Thus was the nation raised to a dignity it had never 
possessed in the past, or rather to a dignity which had been given a name 
in past ages, whenever there was a question of locating the ultimate focus 
of allegiance and loyalty, the highest good for which men could be called 
upon to sacrifice their life.  The Romans had called it patria.  The nearest 
equivalent in English is, I believe, not so much ‘fatherland’ as 
‘country’. . . . 
[T]he idea of country has a long history and a respectable pedigree.  
Patria is an inheritance from classical culture.  It is held out as the 
highest object of love in a number of famous writings which like Cicero’s 
De Officiis, provided the mainstay of education in the West.  Patriotism 
existed long before there were nations, let alone Nation-states.  
[Moreover,] patriotism was not necessarily linked to national 
consciousness or to political allegiance.344 
In no way, d’Entrèves insists, was it a foregone conclusion that what 
he calls “the ultimate focus of allegiance and loyalty” would be the 
nation.345  Instead, the “ultimate focus” has shifted over time and been 
different for different people.  True, for some persons the highest 
allegiance might be to one’s nation, as defined by some confluence of 
language, history, religion, ethnicity, homeland, and the like.  For others, 
though, it would be a personal loyalty to a king; for yet others, it would be 
an allegiance to a particular city—as for Machiavelli to Florence, 
d’Entrèves writes.346  For many men, he insists, “the ideas of State, nation, 
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and country in no sense coincide.”347  For Voltaire, d’Entrèves points out, 
“one’s country is wherever one lives happily and well [ubi bene, ibi 
patria]”348—which amounts to the same thing as saying that the “country” 
or “patria” to which a person feels allegiance “is the result of a choice.” 
Having introduced this idea of ubi bene, ibi patria—that a person 
chooses where his or her loyalty and allegiance lie, based on where he or 
she lives happily and well—d’Entrèves emphasizes how the French 
Revolution illustrates how it is possible for there to be in fact a 
convergence of nation, state, and country. 
[W]e shall never appreciate the tremendous importance of the French 
Revolution unless we realize that it was that revolution which gave the 
concept of nation an entirely new meaning, transforming it, as it were, 
from a mere product of history into a deliberate construction, a 
partnership not only of mores but of wills.  This is the time when we 
witness the final coincidence of the three ideas we have followed 
throughout their erratic independent course.  ‘The nation becomes the 
country,’ but it does so because the nation is the expression of self-
determination, because the State no longer consists in the mere whim of 
the autocrat or in the consolidation of the interests of a few privileged 
classes, but in the sovereignty of the ‘general will’. . . .  [Rousseau, so 
influential in the French Revolution,] was the prophet of the new religion 
which was henceforth to dominate the modern world . . . [in saying that 
patriotism] is the true way to salvation. . . .  [In this view,] Democracy 
joins hands with Nationalism, and the State, hitherto the sum of cold 
calculations of power, gathers to itself a power hitherto unknown.  For 
that power is no less than the outcome of a whole people’s participation 
in those decisions which were at one time the privilege of the few.349 
The French Revolution, then, provided the peculiar political and social 
setting that brought unity to the three concepts—that is, the state as a 
package of political power and authority, the nation as a partly-real but 
partly-contrived social construct,350 and the country or patria as the object 
of a person’s highest loyalty and allegiance.  This unity, d’Entrèves 
reminds us, was short-lived, so that “there was soon once again to be a 
parting of the ways [between state, nation, and country] in this new 
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world.”351  According to d’Entrèves, this parting of the ways reflected the 
dramatic differences that occurred in how various states and nations 
developed in Europe.352  I would emphasize a different reason: the 
dramatic differences in how various states and nations outside Europe 
developed, and particularly how some states that were only recently 
decolonized when d’Entrèves wrote his book (in the 1960s) have surged 
in importance on today’s world stage. 
I find d’Entrèves’s account of these related concepts—state, nation, 
country, patria—directly relevant to my principal aim in this Article.  That 
aim is (i) to emphasize how poorly certain concepts rooted in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century Europe serve the needs of today’s world and (ii) 
to outline how they might be modernized to make them suitable for use in 
addressing global problems.  What d’Entrèves’s account offers is an 
explanation of why the concept of nationality cannot be relied on to convey 
much legal significance today.  Despite the enthusiasm with which some 
leaders of various countries or groupings tout the significance and the 
value of nationality, even a brief historical survey reveals that “nation” and 
“nationality”—like “sovereignty”—are terms that defy clear definition at 
any one point in time, much less over a chaotic history.  They reflect 
historical realities that passed away long ago and that in any event were 
largely ignominious in their origin (efforts by princes to consolidate their 
power).353 
In closing his survey of these terms and their meanings, d’Entrèves 
offers a look to the future.  After highlighting the fact that the modern state 
has drawn on the concept of the nation for legitimacy—hence the term 
“nation-state”—d’Entrèves surmises that whatever fundamental political 
unit emerges in the future will likewise need to find some legitimizing 
concept to lean on for support: 
We often hear it said that the new, the supra-national State, which is 
invoked and longed for today by so many, will be the signal for the final 
disappearance of those nationalisms which have brought Europe to the 
brink of ruin [he refers surely to the two World Wars, both commencing 
on the European continent].  But one thing at least can be said with 
certainty.  Whenever the new [form of] State arises and establishes itself 
as a working proposition, it too will need an ‘ideology’ on which to lean, 
a faith capable of kindling men’s imagination and warming their hearts.  
It will be essential, in other words, for this State to inspire men with a 
spirit of dedication as great as that inspired by the ‘old’ State, and for it 
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to acquire in the eyes of its new citizens the value of a new and better 
communis patria.354 
As I have suggested in my 2017 book,355 a possible legitimizing 
concept for a new form of political organization—what I refer to as the 
“eco-state”—is “ecospheric natural law.” 
IIC. Further Clarity on the Nation-State: Ali Khan and Patrick Glenn 
In the preceding Section, I drew on the writings of Alexander Passerin 
d’Entrèves in the 1960s to highlight how the concept of the nation (like 
the concept of sovereignty) is hard to define, changeable over time, and 
only sporadically and opportunistically associated with the concept of the 
state.  Similar points have been emphasized in more recent writings.  In 
the following paragraphs I draw attention to the writings of two persons 
whom I count among my friends.  Like d’Entrèves, they both explore the 
historical foundations of the so-called nation-state, and they counsel 
against perceiving of it as in any way permanent—or perhaps even present 
today in the real world. 
IIC1.  Accidents of the Past, Diversity of the Future 
In a book published about twenty years ago, L. Ali Khan offers an 
elegant historical account of the state and the sovereignty it came to 
exercise.  He places special emphasis on the peculiar and accidental 
influences—including the foibles and fates of certain individual persons—
that contributed to the victory that political and religious pluralism enjoyed 
in Europe in “dismantl[ing] the authority of the medieval legal order that 
sought to impose, without consultation, one set of values and one set of 
ruling elites [—that is, the values and elites of the Church—] on all 
communities” in that part of the world.356  Urging that we regard the 
concept of the state as a product of those peculiar and accidental 
influences, Ali Khan explains that it should be recognized as “the most 
serious impediment to the creation of a global household” that is already 
under way, haltingly, as a “complex process of enmeshment” among the 
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world’s diverse communities.357  By prevailing over that impediment, Ali 
Khan asserts, we can facilitate the emergence of what he calls “Free State,” 
at which time sovereign borders will “evolve into open borders, allowing 
the free flow of goods, services, capital, labor and persons” and “the 
nation-state loses its identity as a distinct legal entity.”358 
Terms and ideas of this sort—”global household,” “enmeshment” of 
communities around the world, “Free State,” and the like—might strike a 
casual reader as overly imaginative or ethereal, not to mention unlikely in 
today’s world.  Ali Khan addresses that point in two ways.  First, he 
acknowledges that this “Free State” condition is not one that is likely to be 
attained soon, given the fact that in today’s world “many nation-states are 
powerful and many people do not envision beyond their national 
boundaries.”359  Second, he urges the reader to realize that “the Grotian 
concept of the sovereign state was essentially idealistic at the time” that 
Grotius struggled to design a system that could effectively supplant the 
then-dysfunctional and anachronistic political system that despite its 
apparent permanence and unshakeable supremacy was in fact 
experiencing its death-rattle in the Thirty Years War.360  Expressed in an 
oversimplified way: what might seem utterly impracticable today will 
surely change, and it is in fact quite rational to try anticipating and shaping 
such change.  Indeed, perhaps we have a duty to do so in light of such 
pressing environmental dangers as those posed by global climate change 
and soil degradation. 
Ali Khan’s account of the historical formation of the sovereign state 
begins with a synopsis of how the protracted effort following the fall of 
the Western Roman Empire to re-establish “one superpower over diverse 
communities” gained traction, encountered barricades, and ultimately 
collapsed in failure.361  Here is how he characterizes that sweep of history 
and then applies its lessons to the future: 
The historical events that furnished the essential ingredients for the 
formation of the sovereign state involve the era of empires when 
imperialism clashed with the universal church, a fierce struggle leading 
                                                          
 357.   Id. at 3.  
 358.   Id. at 8. 
 359.   Id. at 9.  
 360.   Id. at 1–2. 
 361.   Id. at 13.  He identifies, for instance, the specific roles played by German emperors and 
Roman popes, by competing conceptions of law (“one derived from the power of material resources, 
including weapons, and the other from the authority of theology including morals”), by Muslim Turks, 
by Martin Luther, and by the colonial adventures of the French, the English, the Dutch, and the 
Spaniards—culminating, then in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War by 
“restructur[ing] the genetic composition of the Holy Roman Empire, vesting its principalities with a 
degree of autonomy and legally freeing them from both papal and imperial institutions.”  Id. at 14–15. 
802 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
to their mutual attrition.  The eventual triumph of the sovereign state over 
mighty empires and universal religions is a story of the human will to 
resist the authority of a single superpower, striving to rule all 
communities in every corner of the world, sometimes in the name of One 
Emperor and sometimes in the name of One God.  It reminds us that no 
single people or church can control the destiny of the world.  Nor can the 
social, moral and spiritual development of humanity ever be uniform.  
Diversity, not uniformity, is the driving motif of the human story.  Thus 
the rise of the sovereign state reveals a simple historical secret: any 
attempt to impede the flowering of diversity is doomed to fail.  Even 
when sovereign states seek to mutate into Free States – a central theme 
of this book – the human desire to create and preserve culturally 
divergent communities will continue to thrive.  A single world 
government is, therefore, not a new vision of future society; it is a failed 
medieval dream to be avoided.362 
In short, Ali Khan (i) describes how the sovereign state arose out of 
peculiar historical circumstances, (ii) emphasizes the significance of 
diversity over uniformity as “the driving motif of the human story,” and 
(iii) projects a global political future in which that same drive for diversity 
will continue to prevail, auguring against any singular world 
government.363 
IIC2.  No Such Thing as a Nation-State? 
My late friend Patrick Glenn, formerly at McGill University, uses the 
same starting-point: diversity.  In particular, he has explained that there is 
a strong element of artificiality in the theory that the states in today’s world 
are “national” in character—that is, that they comprise or reflect a single 
“nationality.”  In a book published shortly before his death, Glenn 
emphasized the fact that there is not, and never has been, such a thing as a 
“nation-state.”364  Instead, all states are “cosmopolitan” in character. 
[My] argument is that all states are cosmopolitan in character, often in 
spite of themselves and of the choices they may have made.  Most people 
do not presently think that this is the case . . . but this is principally 
because the western theory of states has been formulated in terms of 
necessary equality and uniformity within states.  It is the notion of a 
“nation-state” that has largely prevailed. . . . 
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[That notion] began as an essentially romantic idea in eighteenth century 
France – the idea that “la nation” should have its own legal and political 
structures . . . [but it] is an idea that has failed.  We have been trying to 
make it succeed for over two centuries now, but it has not succeeded.  It 
is simply not the case that there has ever been a nationstate, and we may 
now therefore draw the conclusion that there never will be.365 
Glenn explains that he is using the term “nation” according to the usual 
definition implying a homogeneous people.366  This definition suggests 
that in order “to have a ‘nation-state’ which is in fact true to this bringing 
together – this confluence of the institutions of both a state and a people – 
you have to find a nation that satisfies the requirement of homogeneity, 
and it must coincide with a given state structure.”367  It is impossible, 
Glenn asserts, to find such a nation-state.  Some of the seemingly obvious 
candidates—he mentions Finland, Germany, Japan, and North Korea—all 
fail to meet the homogeneity test.368  Even such a small state as Tuvalu, 
which might be thought to have a congruence of a nation and a state, fails 
that test: Tuvalu “is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse.”369 
Concluding, therefore, that there is no such thing as a nation-state, 
Glenn proceeds to an even more interesting assertion: “The most 
successful states, moreover, are the states that have been most successful 
in dealing with their own internal diversity.”370  Citing the U.S.A. in 
particular, Glenn offers these observations: 
There is no nation here, in the sense of a homogeneous population.  The 
United States is a successful cosmopolitan state because its legal and 
political project has succeeded – most of the time on most questions – in 
having the people here think in terms of what has been called 
“constitutional patriotism” . . . .  Civic identity thus largely prevails over 
other identities.  There is collaboration in working with diverse peoples.  
So the states that have been seen as the most successful republican and 
united enterprises are in a sense paradoxically the states that have been 
most successful in dealing with their inherently cosmopolitan 
character.371 
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What does Glenn mean by the term “cosmopolitan”?  He takes great 
pains to distinguish that term from the term “universalist”: 
[O]ne can be cosmopolitan without being universalist in character . . . .  
For this I rely on what I take to be the usual meaning of “cosmopolitan,” 
which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “[h]aving the 
characteristics which arise from, or are suited to, a range over many 
different countries.”  This ordinary language understanding of 
cosmopolitanism has been defended with great subtlety by Stephen 
Toulmin, who in the mid-twentieth century argued that “cosmopolitan” 
means what the word indicates – it is a combination of “cosmos,” hence 
“cosmo,” and “polis,” or polity – so that “cosmopolitan” means it is 
possible to have a harmonious bringing together of the cosmos and a 
particular polity.  This understanding of the world implies a notion of 
harmonious coexistence rather than of obligatory universality. 
Given this ordinary language understanding of cosmopolitanism, the 
cosmopolitan state is not a state of domination that purports to impose 
its law on the rest of the world.  It is not a world state or a hegemonic 
state.  Instead, the cosmopolitan state is a state that has dealt more or less 
successfully with the inevitable internal and external diversity within 
which all states must function.  There is no cosmopolitan universal law, 
but there are cosmopolitan attitudes and cosmopolitan methods.  There 
are also cosmopolitan officials who know, in light of the utter 
particularity of each state, how to reconcile in a particular state claims 
for exception to and application of the law and normativity of the 
majority.  In short, the cosmopolitan state has to address the challenge of 
balance.372 
This notion of cosmopolitanism is precisely what I believe should lie 
at the heart of the pluralistic sovereignty that I have introduced briefly at 
the end of Part I of this Article.  The same notion should influence the 
striking of a balance in federalism that I described above.373  I would take 
issue with Glenn, however, in his assertion that there “is no cosmopolitan 
universal law.”374  What will be necessary in order to assure agroecological 
integrity—the subject of my overarching research effort—is a broad 
acceptance of the proposition that some fundamental propositions, 
comprising what I mentioned above as “ecospheric natural law,” are 
universal in character, similar in character to norms of jus cogens as 
recognized in contemporary international law.375 
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Not content with just issuing general prescriptions—for instance, 
insisting that a successful cosmopolitan state is one that creates “a 
harmonious bringing together of the cosmos and a particular polity,” and 
urging that “the cosmopolitan state has to address the challenge of 
balance”376—Glenn offers a fresh conceptual perspective on how to 
achieve such a “bringing together” and such a “balance.”  He draws from 
Hilary Lawson’s 2001 book Closure: A Story of Everything:377 
Lawson says two things.  The first is that the only way we can understand 
the world is to effect some kind of closure.  If you want to do anything, 
if you want to think about anything, you must narrow the focus.  You’ve 
got to decide that this is your problem, this is your unit of political 
construction, this is your legal problem, or whatever it might be. . . .  
Once you’ve effected a closure around a problem, concept, or thing, then 
it becomes possible to study it. 
This is an interesting proposition.  The more important and second part 
of Lawson’s project, however, is to say that closures can never be 
definitive.  Closures can never be definitive because when effecting 
closure, you necessarily effect a closure around something that is part of 
a much larger field of what Lawson calls “texture.”  You are faced 
constantly with a reality of undistinguished texture.  To understand 
anything about that reality, you must effect a kind of closure.  But the 
closure effect is surrounded in an ongoing way by the texture that lies 
beyond the closure you have effected. . . . 
The modern state is a form of closure.  Consider what has happened in 
Europe over the course of several centuries.  Throughout much of 
European legal history, there were recognizably cosmopolitan states with 
ecclesiastical law, commercial law, and, in some measure, Roman law 
running across what are now state borders.  There were many horizontal 
webs of pan-European law. . . .  These horizontal webs of law . . . 
suffered greatly in the process of the territorial and national closures of 
the seventeenth through twentieth centuries. 
This process of political and legal closure had its precedents, of course.  
Before the contemporary state there were other forms of closure.  We 
have had, in earlier times, closure around tribes as the major form of 
legal and political organization.  Tribes have now lost much of their 
significance because the closure of the tribe has given way for many 
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people to other, more tempting forms of closure.  But tribes are still with 
us, as shown by the fact that [US] state law [and Canadian provincial and 
territorial law] recognizes the law of aboriginal peoples. . . . 
Another example from the past: in feudal times we had closure around 
the manor.  The manor was the basic form of organization of feudal 
societies.  [Today, though,] the manor has lost a great deal, if not all, of 
its significance.  It yielded to ongoing attraction of the texture that 
surrounded it.  It gave way to city-states, so called because they were the 
product of a form of political and legal organization meant to be in large 
measure self-sufficient.  The city-states and the manors then gave way to 
kingdoms.  There were even so-called absolutist kingdoms, such as that 
of Louis XIV, the Sun King.  But those kingdoms couldn’t resist other 
forms of closure that emerged from the texture surrounding them.  So we 
saw the emergence of the contemporary state as a territorially bounded 
exclusive source of law for what is meant (or imagined) to be a uniform 
population within it. 
We are finding today that the contemporary state is losing its grip.  States 
are tempted by texture beyond themselves. . . .  [As a consequence], the 
contemporary state today is declining in influence.378 
Beyond this concept of “closure versus texture”—and the progression 
by which each unit of political closures has yielded, one by one, to what 
Glenn calls the “ongoing attraction of the texture that surrounded it”—
Glenn offers one further conceptual perspective that I find directly relevant 
to a study of sovereignty and “nation-states” in today’s world.379  He 
explains the so-called “law of the excluded middle” and says that it is 
gradually (and properly) losing influence in favor of a more subtle and 
accurate view of the world: 
Western lawyers and western people have been taught to think in terms 
of classical logic.  There are so-called “laws of thought.”  [There is, for 
instance,] . . . the “law” of the excluded middle: A or not-A.  Between 
two contradictory propositions, say the classical logicians, there is no 
middle ground.  This is very depressing news for lawyers, faced with the 
important task of finding some area of middle ground over a vast number 
of cases. 
Why is it logically the case that there is an excluded middle?  It flows 
from the basic assumptions of classical logic.  Take me, for example.  I 
am Patrick Glenn.  Classical logic treats me as A, a much crisper notion 
than the real Patrick Glenn.  From my perspective, the rest of the world 
is not Patrick Glenn, or not-A.  Thus it becomes logically “Patrick 
Glenn” or “not-Patrick Glenn” and there is an excluded middle: there is 
nothing between “Patrick Glenn” and “not-Patrick Glenn.”  Why is that 
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logically necessary?  Because “not-Patrick Glenn” starts exactly at the 
(crisp) border of Patrick Glenn and goes on out forever; it is galactic in 
character.  The “not-Patrick Glenn” eats up all possibility of a middle 
ground.  Classical logicians tell us this is how we must think, once there 
has been formulation of initial, crisp and contradictory propositions, and 
the teaching of this logic has been very influential in efforts to construct 
the legal unity thought necessary for a nation-state.  Kelsen relied on it 
explicitly,[380] and codifiers were much influenced by it. 
There are, however, what are being called the “new logics” in the world.  
[One assertion coming from the “new logics”] is that we needn’t take 
classical logic and the “law” of the excluded middle as we have taken it.  
That is because a more subtle view of the world does not accept that 
boundaries are always crisp.  Quantum physics is now telling us this, and 
we already know that normative propositions are always fuzzy in terms 
of their field of application.  All need not be mutually exclusive.  There 
can therefore be a many-valued logic, in which multiple truths can be 
sustained and a middle ground found between them.  This is good news 
for lawyers, though they may have known it all the time. 
To generalize: you can accept contradictions and live with them.  You 
can accept a right to freedom of expression and a right to privacy and 
everything then depends on where particular cases are situated within the 
field defined by those contradictory general principles.  Logicians are 
beginning to recognize that the real world is much subtler than a world 
composed of As and not-As.  It really is possible, as legal practice tells 
us, to find included middles.381 
Glenn draws on this “new logic” that permits the “included middle” 
in order to urge us “to think in terms of cosmopolitan logic” in order to get 
comfortable with the notion of a cosmopolitan state—one in which 
multiple nations and authorities coexist.382  This is the third of three key 
points that Glenn’s account offers to us and that have prompted me to 
emphasize his work here.  First, he confirms what I have already 
emphasized in this Article—that such familiar terms as “state” and 
“nation,” along with “nation-state,” “nationalism,” “nationality,” and even 
“sovereignty,” are so definitionally confused and historically peculiar as 
to lead us away from a clear understanding of today’s world rather than 
toward such an understanding.  Second, all states in today’s world are in 
reality “cosmopolitan states” (not “nation-states”), and those states that are 
more cosmopolitan (and more comfortable with that fact) are the states 
that are (in Glenn’s estimation) most successful.  Third, whatever 
“closure” we engage in for purposes of defining any unit of political 
                                                          
 380.   For this, Glenn cites HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 206 (Max Knight trans., 1989) 
(1960) (discussing “the Principle of the Exclusion of Contradictions”). 
 381.   Glenn-KLR, supra note 364, at 750–51 (citing KELSEN, supra note 380) (emphasis added).  
 382.   Id. at 752. 
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organizations state—such as the tribe, or the manor, or the city-state, or 
the (cosmopolitan) state—is necessarily artificial and tentative in at least 
two ways: (i) as a practical matter, the unit defined by such a process of 
“closure” has a tendency to yield to what Glenn calls the “ongoing 
attraction of the texture that surround[s] it”; and (ii) as a logical matter, 
the law of the “included middle” asserts that boundaries are not always 
crisp, and therefore we should be neither surprised nor discomfited at the 
prospect of multiple nations and authorities coexisting within a particular 
state.383  Borders are porous in many or most respects, and that is a good 
thing. 
Let me move briefly from politics to earth science.  We can see in 
these three points emerging from Glenn’s writing on the cosmopolitan 
state (as a political matter) a very close similarity to more contemporary 
views of the ecosphere.  Some scientists and philosophers have urged 
recently, especially in view of our growing knowledge about the vastness 
of the universe and the tininess of those single-celled organisms that 
comprise the bulk of life on Earth, that we examine the scale of our 
perception and consider what new insights might be generated through 
shifting our scale of perception.384  From our usual perspective from inside 
the pedosphere—that is, from inside the system of all the organisms, soils, 
water, and air lying at the interface of the lithosphere, the atmosphere, the 
hydrosphere, and the biosphere385—we typically think of some parts of 
Earth as living and others as non-living.  For instance, animals and plants 
                                                          
 383.   See id. at 746–52. 
 384.   See Wes Jackson, Aubrey Streit Krug, Bill Vitek & Robert Jensen, Transforming Human 
Life on Our Home Planet, Perennially, 2 ECOLOGICAL CITIZEN (2018), https://www.ecologicalcitizen. 
net/pdfs/v02n1-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA64-9WE7].  These authors draw on the writings of Stan 
Rowe, a geo-ecologist and environmentalist who worked as a research forester with Forestry Canada 
for nineteen years and also served as Professor of Plant Ecology at the University of Saskatchewan.  
Rowe urged his readers to stop thinking about “organisms as possessing life” and start thinking instead 
of “life as possessing organisms.”  HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 387.  In discussing the relationship 
between life, the ecosphere, and organisms, Rowe explains that “[f]or thousands of years, humans 
have been viewers immersed in the Ecosphere,” and thus unable to see clearly that the Ecosphere is in 
fact an entity that itself has life.  J. Stan Rowe, Biological Fallacy: Life = Organisms, ECOCENTRISM 
(1992), http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/RoBiolFallacy.html [https://perma.cc/KW2Z-CJXD]. (first 
published in 42 BIOSCIENCE 6 (1992)).  However, Rowe clarifies, the Ecosphere “is not a 
superorganism; it is supraorganic: a higher level of organization than plants and animals, including 
people.”  Id.  Moreover, he insists, the world is not riven with competition: “The lively Ecosphere 
gives the lie to those who see the world’s reality as little more than a competitive arena, for without 
compliant cooperation among its multitudinous parts the diversifying creativity of the planet could not 
have evolved nor could its overall homeostasis continue.”  Id.  For biographical information about 
Stan Rowe and copies of some of his works, see About the Authors and Translators, ECOCENTRISM, 
http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/aboutauthors.html#rowe [https://perma.cc/8ETM-FF9R].  
 385.   By some definitions, the pedosphere—from Greek πέδον (pedon, which is “soil” or “earth”) 
and σφαίρα (sfaíra, which is “sphere”)—is the outermost layer of the Earth that is composed of soil 
and subject to soil formation processes.  For more details on the pedosphere, see generally ELISSA 
SHART LEVINE, THE PEDOSPHERE AS A HUB (2001).  
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seem dynamic but the environments we live in, with their stones and gases 
and water and wind, seem non-living.  Likewise, we think we can easily 
draw lines between different “spheres” of the Earth as a structure, such as 
the biosphere versus the atmosphere.  However, this “from the inside” 
viewpoint is only one perspective.  When we take a view not from the 
inside but rather from the outside, we can start to realize how all 
components inside the system interact in extraordinarily complex ways.  
We can start to imagine how life is a property of the whole system, rather 
than merely a property exhibited by just some parts of the system. 
One thing that I believe we can learn from the writings I highlighted 
above from Glenn, d’Entrèves, and Hechter, as well as from several of the 
writers I referred to in Part I of this Article relating to sovereignty, is that 
the scale of our perception has a crucial bearing on how we understand the 
social and political world.  Just as we can draw lines between different 
“spheres” in the natural world, we can do so in the political world as well 
by using such familiar terms as “state,” “nation,” “sovereignty,” and the 
like.  Yet in both cases, we must be careful not to let those lines and 
definitions lead us away from a clear understanding of today’s world.  
Likewise, just as a view of the natural world “from the outside” helps us 
realize how all natural systems on Earth interact in complex and 
interdependent ways, a view of the political world “from the outside” 
helps us realize how all political systems—at such various (artificial and 
tentative) levels as the village, the region, the state, or the Earth as a 
whole—interact in complex and interdependent ways.  Therefore the more 
knowledgeable and appreciative we are about those complexities and 
interdependencies, the more successful we can be in our efforts at acting 
cooperatively to address global problems that we share. 
The global problems that I concentrate on in my research are those of 
agricultural and ecological degradation.  It happens, therefore, that the 
analogies I am trying to draw here—between (i) new and well-considered 
perspectives on global political reality and (ii) new and well-considered 
perspectives on the Earth’s natural systems—are particularly close and 
clear ones.  One element of them both that I have not yet adequately 
emphasized concerns land territory.  I turn now to that element. 
IID.  Territorial Integrity, Ownership, and Responsibility 
Thus far in this Article, I have dealt somewhat separately with the 
concepts of sovereignty and the nation-state.  In fact, Part I of this Article 
has dealt with the first of these, whereas Part II has dealt up to now mainly 
with the second one.  In one especially important respect, though, the two 
concepts of sovereignty and the nation-state—fuzzy and unsatisfying as 
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those concepts may be—coincide: territory.  Consider these points: 
 The definition of a state virtually always includes territory as 
an element.  For instance, the Montevideo Convention of the 
1920s—more formally known as the Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States—offers a definition of “state” that 
has become very widely accepted and cited: “The state as a 
person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into 
relations with the other states.”386 
 The definition of sovereignty in international law likewise is 
inextricably bound up with the idea of territory.  Consider this 
definition, drawing from some of the most recognized and 
respected authorities in international law: “The exercise of . . . 
supreme authority by a State over its own territory is known 
in International Law as ‘territorial sovereignty’. . . .  
Territorial sovereignty signifies ownership and possession of 
a territory, which entitles a State to exercise its authority and 
jurisdiction over the territory.”387 
 A similar characterization of the central role played by 
territory appears in this excerpt: “The principle whereby a 
state is deemed to exercise exclusive power over its territory 
can be regarded as a fundamental axiom of classical 
international law.”388 
 Territory figures prominently in the descriptions of 
                                                          
 386.   Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 
(emphasis added).  The Montevideo Convention is technically binding as a matter of treaty law only 
among its sixteen parties, all of which are in the Americas and all of which ratified it in late 1933.  
However, as many international law authorities have asserted, the definition of a state found in the 
convention codifies customary international law and is therefore binding on all states.  See, e.g., D.J. 
HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (6th ed. 2004). 
 387.   Walid Abdulrahim, State Territory and Territorial Sovereignty, https://sites.google.com/ 
site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-in-english/6-state-territory-and-territorial-sovereignty 
[https://perma.cc/3NR8-5WSH] (emphasis added) (citing L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 
(R.J. Jennings & A.D. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); J.L. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 142 (4th ed. 1949); 
M. N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 411–26 (5th ed. 2003)). 
 388.   Malcolm N. Shaw, The International Court of Justice and the Law of Territory, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 151 (Christian 
J. Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013) (emphasis added).  Shaw goes on to assert that “[t]he development 
of international law upon the basis of the exclusive authority of the state within an accepted territorial 
framework has meant that territory has become ‘perhaps the fundamental concept of international 
law’.”  Id. (quoting from D.P. O’Connell).  He further notes that despite recent political, technological, 
and economic changes, “it is fair to say that territorial sovereignty remains at the core of international 
law.”  Id. at 152. 
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sovereignty offered by the various authorities I cited in Part I 
of this Article.389 
 The UN Charter reflects the notion of territorial sovereignty 
in Article 2(4), which is widely regarded as a centerpiece of 
the collective-defense system that the Charter establishes, and 
as being reflective of the principle of sovereignty: “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.”390 
In short, traditional international law views control over territory as 
being critical to the existence of a state.  Such control over territory seems 
to be, in fact, a sine qua non of both statehood and sovereignty. 
Like those broader concepts, however, the notion of territory—and 
particularly the assertion that a state has exclusive or comprehensive 
control over what occurs in “its” territory—has come under intense 
scrutiny, especially in recent years.  Academic literature on the topic 
includes numerous works reflecting a reevaluation of the roles that 
territory and territorial control play in international law and in the concepts 
of sovereignty and the state.391  While this expansive literature covers 
many topics, I wish to draw attention to only three, because they have 
special significance to the subjects that dominate my current research 
work—agricultural reform and ecological protection at the global level—
                                                          
 389.   See, e.g., supra notes 46 (Bartelson), 123 (Krasner), 171 (Heller and Sofaer), and 378 
(Glenn) and accompanying text. 
 390.   U.N. CHARTER art. 2, ¶ 4 (emphasis added).  
 391.   For some especially significant contributions to the literature, see the work of Marcelo 
Kohen, including Marcelo G. Kohen, Is the Notion of Territorial Sovereignty Obsolete?, in 
BORDERLANDS UNDER STRESS 35 (Martin Pratt & Janet Allison-Brown eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
Kohen-2000]; MARCELO G. KOHEN, TERRITORIALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016).  In the first 
of those works, Kohen makes this assertion: “It is no coincidence that ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territory’ are 
inextricably linked terms: the events that led to the emergence of the modern state had as their mainstay 
the territorial basis of the exercise of power.”  Kohen-2000, supra, at 35.  Despite this, Kohen explains, 
territory and sovereignty increasingly need to be viewed separately, partly because sovereignty itself 
has undergone change as a concept and a practice: “Globalisation, interdependence and integration are 
contemporary phenomena which supposedly render the traditional concept of sovereignty obsolete.  
Indeed, more and more of the powers which pertained to states not so long ago are today vested in 
international institutions.”  Id.  Some scholars, he continues, “refer to a new notion, ‘inter-
sovereignty’, in order to explain the relinquishment of sovereignty by states in fields of common 
interest, where the decisions are shared with the other members of the international community.”  Id. 
(citing a 1988 work by Seara Vaszquez).  “Moreover, territorial sovereignty is traditionally confined 
to one particular status: the state’s spatial sphere of jurisdiction.  This definition does not take into 
account other statuses . . . .”  Id. at 37.  Indeed, Kohen asserts, even though it is true that “[t]he display 
of state power over a territory is normally the main manifestation of sovereignty, . . . it is not the main 
characteristic of sovereignty.  A state can control territory without being its sovereign.”  Id.  In short, 
the linkage between territory and sovereignty is less obvious and more nuanced than in earlier times. 
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and also, as it happens, at the personal, individual level.  The three topics 
are territorial integrity, territorial control, and territorial responsibility.  I 
will deal with each point briefly. 
What is meant by territorial integrity?  As noted in the bullet-point list 
I offered just above,392 the UN Charter makes express reference to 
territorial integrity.  In international law, this Charter provision has been 
viewed largely as bearing on the stability of national boundaries, as 
reflected in this comment in a “user’s guide” to a UN-initiated treaty: 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires all member states to ‘refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’ While the 
Charter does not define what it actually means by ‘territorial integrity’, 
it is now well recognised and reflects the fundamental international 
objective in the stability of boundaries.  In 1986, a chamber of the ICJ 
considered the principle as one of general international law.  This view 
was confirmed by the ‘Badinter Commission’ regarding the former 
Yugoslav republics, stating that ‘whatever the circumstances, the right 
of self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at 
the time of independence.’393 
If we view the notion of “territorial integrity,” however, from the 
perspective of agriculture and ecology, surely a broader definition is 
warranted than what appears in these UN Charter references.  Let us 
construct such a broader definition by considering carefully each of the 
components—that is, the word “territory” and the word “integrity,” 
starting with the latter. 
Dictionaries typically give two main definitions for “integrity.”  The 
first definition focuses on ethical behavior and often refers to honesty, 
rectitude, good character, righteousness, virtue, decency, and truthfulness.  
The second definition is usually captured in the word “wholeness,” to 
convey the sense of a complete, entire, undamaged, and unimpaired 
condition—with such synonyms as “soundness,” “unity,” “coherence,” 
and “solidarity.”394  It is the second of these definitions that has more 
                                                          
 392.   See supra note 390 and accompanying text. 
 393.   Territorial Integrity, UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION ONLINE USER’S GUIDE, 
http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/the-convention/part-ii-general-principles/article-8-general 
-obligation-to-cooperate/8-1-3-territorial-integrity/ [https://perma.cc/PZ34-GRBT] (citing ICJ 
opinions and other authorities).   
 394.   These and similar definitions and synonyms can be found in a range of online sources, 
including those supplied by Merriam-Webster.  See Integrity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integrity [https://perma.cc/UFV4-HLHD] (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2019).  
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relevance for territorial integrity in this context. 
The word “integrity” comes from the Latin adjective integer, which 
itself combines three elements from Latin: 
 the prefix in-, which in this sense corresponds to English  
“un-”, having a negative force, as in the words “indefensible” 
or “inorganic”; 
 -teg-, which is the combining form of tag-, which in turn is 
the base of tangere, “to touch”; and 
 the suffix -er.395 
Taken together, these three elements create a literal meaning for 
“integer” of “untouched” (in-teg-er = un-“touch”-ed) and related 
meanings of “whole” or “complete”—as can be seen in the English word 
“integer” as referring to “a whole number” as opposed to a fraction—and 
also conveying other related meanings of “untainted” and “upright.”396  
Some sources would extend the connotation of “integer” to include 
“unhurt,” “unchanged,” “sound,” “fresh,” “whole,” “entire,” “pure,” and 
even “honest” (which brings this second definition of “integrity” close to 
the first definition focusing on ethical behavior).397  It is this array of 
meanings for “integer” that gives rise to the “wholeness” definition of 
“integrity” that I explained two paragraphs before this one. 
It is with these meanings in mind for “integer,” and for the word 
“integrity” emerging from it, that we can specify what the word “integrity” 
might mean in the context of international law as it involves such concepts 
of sovereignty, the state, and most particularly “territorial integrity.”  This 
requires that we examine the term “territory.”  In doing so, we can place 
the notion of “territorial integrity” in a broader perspective than one 
focusing mainly on the stability of national boundaries, as reflected in 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
The term “territory” carries various meanings that typically combine 
two main elements: (i) an area of the Earth’s surface (usually land but 
sometimes water) and (ii) a sense of belonging or ownership.  An online 
search yields such definitions as these for “territory”: 
 An area of land, or sometimes sea, that is considered as 
belonging to or connected with a particular country of person. 
                                                          
 395.  Integer, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/integer 
[https://perma.cc/XR55-DJZ8] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (noting that the term first appeared in 
English around 1500 as a noun and in the 1570s as a noun). 
 396.   Id.  
 397.   See Integer, WIKTIONARY, en.wiktionary.org/wiki/integer [https://perma.cc/J4NV-SL2M] 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
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 An area of land under the jurisdiction of a ruler or state. 
 Any separate tract of land belonging to a state. 
 The area that an animal defends against intruders, especially 
of the same species.398 
 A field or sphere of action, thought, etc.; the domain or 
province of something.399 
 Any tract of land; a region or district. 
Many of those definitions have strong political content,400 but some of 
them—the last one in the above bullet-point list, for instance—can be 
regarded as quite general, having mainly a geographical content.  
Interestingly, the next-to-last item on that bullet-point list departs from the 
pattern of the others in its omission of any reference to a physical location 
or area; instead, it focuses on a subject-matter. 
According to some on-line sources, the word “territory” appeared in 
Middle English during the first half of the fifteenth century, drawn from 
the Latin term territōrium, meaning the land around a town.401  The 
derivation of the term territōrium, however, is subject to some uncertainty.  
One theory is that territōrium comes from terra (“land”), -tor (“er,” used 
for forming agent nouns,) and ium (“ity,” for forming abstract nouns).  
Another theory also identifies terra (“land”) as a source for territōrium but 
asserts that the latter portion of the word comes from -orium, a suffix 
denoting place.  A third theory suggests a derivation from terrere, which 
means “to frighten”; in this sense territōrium would mean “a place from 
which people are warned off.”402  A fourth theory focuses on torium as the 
root giving rise to such words “as ‘tower’, ‘tour’, and ‘torre’, which 
conveyed in Medieval English, Old French, Italian, and Spanish the 
meaning of both ‘a well-rounded building’ and ‘a position of strength’.”403 
This close attention to etymology reveals, then, a penchant for 
                                                          
 398.   According to one source, this use of “territory”—meaning an area defended by animals—
dates only from 1774.  Douglas Harper, Territory, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/territory [https://perma.cc/QB45-2E3M] (last visited Mar. 30, 
2019). 
 399.   An illustration of this meaning would appear in the phrase “for Donald Trump, unfettered 
self-adulation is familiar territory.” 
 400.   For instance, the notion of “jurisdiction” (a legal and political concept) often figures 
prominently in definitions of “territory,” and especially in the types of territory appearing on lists of 
related definitions.  These include capital territory, federal territory, overseas territory, dependent 
territory, disputed territory, and occupied territory. 
 401.   See Territory, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/territory 
[https://perma.cc/HV95-G65W] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).  Another source dates the appearance of 
“territory” to the late fourteenth century.  See source cited supra note 398. 
 402.   See supra note 398. 
 403.   Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Territory and Boundaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012). 
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regarding territory as a geographic region accompanied by some sense of 
belonging or ownership.  I believe that the common understanding of such 
a sense of belonging or ownership is that it is the geographical region, 
which is the thing that is owned or that “belongs to” some human 
institution such as a state.  In other words, we typically think of a 
geographic area as “belonging to” a state, in the way that we typically 
think of a parcel of land “belonging to” and being “owned by” an 
individual human being or a group of private persons. 
What if we turn the tables?  I suggest that we try thinking of the sense 
of “belonging” and “ownership” as running in the other direction.  Perhaps 
it is easier to think in this way by examining first the notion of private 
ownership of a parcel of land and explore two related propositions.  The 
first is that there is a logical and legal flaw in considering a person to be 
“the owner of a parcel of land” at all.  The second is that the sort of 
ownership or “belonging” involved in the case of a parcel of land runs 
from the person as the thing that in some sense “belongs to” or is “owned 
by” the land, instead of the other way around. 
In my earlier book on international law and agroecological husbandry, 
I emphasized that property claims over land have substantially changed, 
as a legal matter, with the passage of time.404  In particular, I summarized 
these views from Sanjay Kabir Bavikatte, as expressed in his book 
Stewarding the Earth: Rethinking Property and the Emergence of 
Biocultural Rights: 
The understanding of property in law has never been constant, and 
discussions around the concept are among the most contested areas of 
jurisprudence.  In fact, if we approach law as politics, then the discourse 
of property is perhaps the epicentre.  The very notion of personhood, and 
hence the juridical subject in liberal democracies, is based on an 
assumption that a right to property is integral to what we understand as 
‘person’ . . . [since such liberal democracies typically characterize] 
personhood as incorporating a bundle of individual rights including the 
right to property. . . . 
[Some modern observers, however, are attempting to correct some 
major] fallacies regarding property in capitalist societies. . . .  
[One of these fallacies arises] where property is understood as a thing 
rather than a right.  The influential Canadian political scientist C. B. 
Macpherson in his analysis of property notes: ‘In current common usage, 
property is things; [but] in law and in the [works of legal] writers, 
property is not things, but rights, rights in or to things’. . . .  The reason 
                                                          
 404.   See HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 309–12. 
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why [this is a fallacy is that it is] a product of historical circumstances, 
specifically of the dominance of market economies, which . . . [despite 
their recent development] are passed off as ahistorical and natural.405 
Importantly, the description that Bavikatte gives in this passage of the 
“notion of personhood” applies equally to states as to individuals: it is a 
fundamental tenet of international law that statehood (like “personhood,” 
in Bavikatte’s formulation) is seen as “incorporating a bundle of . . . rights 
including the right to property.”406  After all, as noted above, the standard 
definition of a “state” includes territory as one of its four elements.407  
Therefore, the first of the two “fallacies” that Bavikatte identifies—the 
fallacy of understanding property as a thing rather than a right—can exist 
in the case of territorial claims made by states as well as in the case of 
individual property claims.  In exploring that fallacy further, Bavikatte 
quotes Macpherson in pinpointing when the first of these developments—
that is, the equating of property with things rather than rights—arose: 
The change in common usage, to treating property as things themselves, 
came with the spread of the full capitalist market economy from the 
seventeenth century on, and the replacement of the old limited rights in 
land and other valuable things by virtually unlimited rights.  As rights in 
land became more absolute, and parcels of land became more freely 
marketable commodities, it became natural to think of the land itself as 
property.408 
Put in the context of parcels or regions of land, correcting this 
commodification-of-land fallacy involves returning to a way of thinking 
in which property is not the land itself but certain rights in the land.  
Making this correction—whether in the case of individual property or in 
                                                          
 405.   SANJAY KABIR BAVIKATTE, STEWARDING THE EARTH: RETHINKING PROPERTY AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF BIOCULTURAL RIGHTS 116, 116 n.2, 117 (2014) (citing C.B. Macpherson, The 
Meaning of Property, in, PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 2 (C.B. Macpherson, 
ed., 1978)).  Bavikatte is an environmental lawyer who founded the international organization Natural 
Justice, has served as legal advisor to several African countries, and has worked through the United 
Nations and other entities in coordinating grassroots initiatives with indigenous peoples on 
environmental matters.  Id. at 267.  
 406.   Id. 116, 116 n.2. 
 407.   See supra note 386 and accompanying text.  The phrase “bundle of entitlements” is 
commonly used in the context of international law.  See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law 
Really ‘Law’?, NW. U. SCH. OF L. SCHOLARLY COMMONS 1, 12 (2010), http://scholarlycommons.law. 
northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=facultyworkingpapers [https://perma.cc 
/JEM2-DNFV] (“As a construct of international law, a nation is nothing more nor less than a bundle 
of entitlements, of which the most important ones define and secure its boundaries on a map, while 
others define its jurisdictional competency and the rights of its citizens when they travel outside its 
borders.”). 
 408.   Bavikatte, supra note 405, at 118 (quoting C.B. MACPHERSON, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 
7–8 (1978)). 
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the case of a state’s “territory”—clears the way for a more (accurately) 
pluralistic and disaggregated view in which various rights in property can 
be owned by various entities.  At the level of international law, the entities 
generally recognized as having legal “personality” are (i) states and (ii) 
international organizations—by which I mean such institutions as the 
United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the World Trade Organization, and 
others that have states as members—are not incorporated within any 
particular state, have a set of privileges and immunities that resemble those 
of states, and are governed by treaties that give them (either explicitly or 
implicitly) treaty-making and other powers. 
It follows from this analysis that a state is not properly seen as 
“owning” the geographical region that denominates the territory that 
helps define it but should instead be seen as possessing a great many 
rights—but not all rights—to exercise authority within that geographical 
region.  Expressed differently, it is certain rights, but typically not all 
rights, that “belong” to a state in “its” territory.  Indeed, the rich variety of 
political arrangements described in the Tibet-related book that I referred 
to above in Section IC2 of this Article (Regional Autonomy, Cultural 
Diversity and Differentiated Territorial Government) illustrates how 
common it is to find blended, mixed-and-matched political authorities to 
exist within any particular geographic region, despite the fact that such 
region is regarded as being part of the territory of a particular state. 
Having emphasized in the preceding paragraphs that there is an 
analogy between (i) the rights of a person over land and (ii) the rights of a 
state over “its” territory, I should emphasize that the forms of control and 
authority that a state has over land are in fact more complicated than the 
discussion thus far suggests.  In explaining key details of privately-owned 
land, publicly-owned land, and state territory, Ali Khan offers these 
historical and definitional observations: 
To clarify the concept of territory as an essential element of the sovereign 
state, Grotius invokes Seneca and others to distinguish between 
ownership and sovereignty.  Ownership is tied to the estate; sovereignty 
is tied to the territory.  The land an individual owns constitutes a private 
estate.  Public estates are the land the state owns.  All private and public 
estates within a state’s borders jointly make up the territory of the state.  
With respect to public lands, the state possesses both ownership and 
sovereignty while over property the state has sovereignty without 
ownership.  Thus even if every inch of land is privately owned, the 
territory remains subject to state sovereignty.  This is so because the 
same land can be both an estate and a piece of the state’s territory, 
simultaneously containing the rights of both the owner and the state.  The 
ownership of an estate may be transferred from one person to another, 
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even from the individual to the state or vice versa.  But changes in 
ownership do not affect state sovereignty over the territory.409 
Ali Khan then explains that these legal principles about land 
ownership and territorial claims “might be derived from the feudal 
principle that the king is the ultimate owner of all land.”410  In any event, 
the same general proposition of ultimate priority prevails in the 
international legal concept of a state’s territory: a private owner’s rights in 
an estate are in some measure always subject to the state’s territorial 
sovereignty.  Or, as Ali Khan expresses it, “the state’s right derived from 
territorial sovereignty is superior to the owner’s right derived from estate 
ownership.”411  As an illustration of this, Ali Khan reminds us that “[t]he 
state may lawfully forbid the owner from committing any crime on the 
estate.”412 
In short, the rights of a state over land, in today’s system, comprise 
two broad categories: (i) the state may possess certain rights of ownership 
(speaking technically, as noted above, what is owned is a set of rights, not 
the land itself), and (ii) the state will in any event possess rights inherent 
in its territorial claim to that land as falling with its recognized 
jurisdiction.  The second of these categories of rights over land does not 
apply, of course, to individuals, although the first category does.  What I 
wish to posit is that the second category of rights might be possessed not 
only by the so-called “nation-states” of the sort that have dominated the 
world for the past four centuries or so—entities that we might better call 
“anthro-states” to reflect Patrick Glenn’s insistence that there is no such 
thing as a “nation-state”413—but also by another form of political entity 
that I call the “eco-state.”414 
A key rationale for such an innovation is that placing such authority 
over land not with traditional “nation-states” but rather with eco-states 
would facilitate a more effective program of restoration and preservation 
of the natural environmental endowments of the land—that is, their soils 
(pedosphere), their water (hydrosphere), their air (atmosphere), and their 
biodiversity (biosphere).  This closer attention to restoration and 
protection would, in turn, involve a keen acknowledgement that the rights 
and interest in these natural environmental endowments and features 
                                                          
 409.   KHAN, supra note 356, at 61–62. 
 410.   Id. at 62. 
 411.   Id.  
 412.   Id.  
 413.   See supra note 364 and accompanying text. 
 414.   I introduced this assertion in HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 373–74, 379, and I intend to 
elaborate on it in HEAD-2019, supra note 4.  See also supra note 290. 
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“belong” not just to the currently-recognized “owners” but to future 
generations of humans and to present and future generations of other 
species. 
Let me turn now to the second logical and legal flaw I noted above: 
the mistake of thinking that the sort of ownership or “belonging” involved 
in the case of a parcel of land always runs from the land as the thing that 
in some sense “belongs to” or is “owned by” the person—or, at the 
international level, by the state—instead of the other way around.  Here is 
the issue expressed in an overly-simplified form as it would apply to my 
wife and me: Do we own the eighty-eight acre tract of land we live on 
southwest of Lawrence, Kansas, or does it own us? 
Recall that the title song in the play (and movie) Oklahoma includes 
these lines: “We know we belong to the land, And the land we belong to is 
grand.”415  Aldo Leopold expressed a similar sentiment in lamenting the 
paltry efforts to protect land from degradation by humans: 
Conservation is getting nowhere because it is incompatible with our 
Abrahamic concept of land.  We abuse land because we regard it as a 
commodity belonging to us.  When we see land as a community to which 
we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect.416 
Countless others have expressed a similar notion—that as humans we 
belong to, and are part of, and cannot live separately from, the rest of the 
natural world in which we have our being.417  What I wish to emphasize, 
though, in the present discussion of territorial sovereignty is this: we 
should attempt to regard a state as “belonging to” its territory instead of 
                                                          
 415.   Restored Cinema Footage, Oklahoma! – Oklahoma (1955), YOUTUBE (Sep. 3, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdymQslE1xs [https://perma.cc/J4XF-59P9].  
 416.   ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC viii (1949) (emphasis added). 
 417.   The interdependence of humans in society was taken for granted in earlier times.  Stephen 
Greenblatt’s description of life in fifteenth century Europe reflects this sense of interdependence: “An 
isolated individual, considered outside the structures of family and occupation, made very little sense.  
What mattered was what you belonged to or even whom you belonged to. . . .  The household, the 
kinship network, the guild, the corporation—these were the building blocks of personhood” within the 
societies of that time.  STEPHEN GREENBLATT, THE SWERVE: HOW THE WORLD BECAME MODERN 15–
16 (2011).  Greenblatt then explants a consequence of this social structure: “Independence and self-
reliance had no cultural purchase; indeed, they could scarcely be conceived, let alone prized.  Identity 
came with a precise, well-understood place in a chain of command and obedience.”  Id. at 16.  While 
numerous attributes of individual human independence—and human rights—are to be celebrated in 
modern society, it is worth bearing in mind that humans must be integrated into, and not pretend to be 
independent from, the natural world and its systems and limitations.  Therefore, to modify Greenblatt’s 
formulation with an ecological emphasis: “The ecosystem, the network of species, and the processes 
they contribute to – these are the building blocks of personhood within the natural world. . . .  Identity 
comes with a precise, well-understood place in a system of physical and biological parameters and 
possibilities.”  It is in that sense that, as Leopold expressed it, we should “see land as a community to 
which we belong.”  LEOPOLD, supra note 416, at viii.  Indeed, we should see the entire ecosphere as 
a community to which we belong.  
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the other way around.  More precisely, the human population living in a 
particular ecosystem should regard itself as a part of that ecosystem, in 
the same way that other species of plants and animals must do.  From an 
ecological standpoint, no species (or individual within that species) can 
long survive if it does not harmonize its behavior with the fundamental 
realities of that ecosystem where it lives and which it shares with other 
species. 
Hence, as a conceptual and legal matter, the notion of “territorial 
sovereignty” should be modified in several ways.  Let me highlight five.  
First, this sort of “sovereignty” should not be equated with “ownership” in 
the sense of owning land; instead, the more technically-accurate notion of 
owning rights in land should be adopted, thus reflecting the fact that some 
rights in the land—some aspects of sovereignty over a territory—are 
allocated to one set of rights-holders and others are allocated to a different 
set of rights-holders.  Rights to enjoy the fruits of the land, for instance, 
might be held by persons other than those who hold the right to sell it. 
Second, as a corollary to the point just made, territorial sovereignty 
should not be regarded as territorial license or unfettered discretion on the 
part of the rights-holder to treat the land, and the ecosystems it comprises, 
in an abusive way.  Just as, in Ali Khan’s words, “[t]he state may lawfully 
forbid the owner from committing any crime on the estate,”418 likewise the 
state itself must be refrained, or be constrained, from degrading any 
aspects of those ecosystems.  Expressed differently, territorial sovereignty 
must be regarded as involving as much responsibility for land as it does 
rights over land. 
Third, the specific aspects of territorial sovereignty that relate directly 
to its “environment,” construed broadly, should fall within the authority of 
eco-states, as I have referred to them briefly above, rather than within the 
authority of the traditional entities we commonly refer to as nation-states.  
Naturally, distinctions will be difficult to make in some respects as to what 
does and what does not relate directly to the environment of a region. 
Fourth, inasmuch as placing environmental rights and responsibilities 
with eco-states will allow giving closer attention to restoration and 
protection, it must also facilitate an acknowledgement that natural 
environmental endowments and features “belong” not just to the currently-
recognized “owners” but to future generations of humans and to present 
and future generations of other species.  In this manner, a proper 
conceptualization of sovereignty should recognize both intergenerational 
and interspecies interests and equities. 
                                                          
 418.   KHAN, supra note 356, at 62. 
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Fifth, using the term “territorial sovereignty,” and analogizing it to 
property ownership, should not stand in the way of an effort to regard a 
state, or more precisely its people, as “belonging to” its territory instead of 
the other way around.  A human population in an ecosystem must, in the 
words of the song Oklahoma (given above), “know we belong to the land.”  
Terminology matters; concepts matter.  Just as the well-worn term “nation-
state” is deeply misleading, the term “territorial sovereignty” can be 
misleading. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
I have analyzed in this Article (i) the doctrine of sovereignty and (ii) 
the so-called nation-state that purports to possess and exercise such 
sovereignty.  By means of this analysis I have emphasized how poorly 
certain concepts rooted in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe 
serve the needs of today’s world, and indeed how in many ways they stand 
in the way of effective governance, especially relating to environmental 
issues.  Many of the observers whose work I have examined and 
summarized here criticize these hoary concepts so strenuously as to 
recommend abandoning entirely both the concepts and the terms that name 
them. 
My approach is only slightly less drastic: since the terms 
“sovereignty” and “state” have such recognizable stature in the language 
of international law and politics, we might usefully retain them, at least 
temporarily, but also offer revised versions of each that will encompass 
new elements aimed at refashioning them for today’s world.  In that 
respect, I have introduced the concepts of “pluralistic sovereignty” (as 
distinct from the “monolithic sovereignty” that I described in Part I of this 
Article) and the “eco-state.”  Thus far, I have only sketched their general 
contours.  Their elaboration is central to my larger research project.419 
 
                                                          
 419.   As noted above, I have introduced this assertion in HEAD-2017, supra note 4, at 373–74, 
379, and I intend to elaborate on it in HEAD-2019, supra note 4.  For my observations about the 
applicability of the “eco-state” concept to the Mediterranean Basin and similar ecoregions elsewhere 
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